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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis aims to analyze the similarity of the change in Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s approaches to the meaning of life. The main argument is that their 
approach to the meaning of life changed from a metaphysical perspective to an anti-
metaphysical one. 
Nietzsche gave a metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life in the Birth 
of Tragedy. In this book Nietzsche conceived of Ancient Greek culture as the ideal 
culture since it was the product of the union of the two artistic deities: Apollo and 
Dionysus. This Primordial Unity (Ur-Eine), for Nietzsche, was the metaphysical essence 
of the world and the meaning of life was to be found in this unity. Nietzsche, later, with 
his new preface to the Birth of Tragedy called “An Attempt at a Self-Criticism” and 
Human All Too Human, criticized his earlier metaphysical approach to the meaning of 
life and shifted to an anti-metaphysical perspective.  
Wittgenstein had a similar shift in his thought. The Tractatus was written to 
explore the nature of reality and the world, and explain the relationship between the 
world and language. The Tractatus gave a metaphysical explanation of the nature of 
reality by dividing it into two levels, the world —the lower— and the mystical —the 
higher. Logic, ethics, aesthetics and religion are the mystical which is the scaffolding of 
the world. Language, on this view, can only state the world—totality of facts— and 
cannot state what is higher. Ethics is about the meaning of life thus the meaning of life is 
higher and cannot be attained within the limits of this world. Later Wittgenstein in 
Philosophical Investigations argued against this metaphysical interpretation of the 
meaning of life. From an anti-metaphysical point of view, Wittgenstein argued that the 
meaning of life can be found within the limits of this world.  
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INTRODUCTION 
(i) The meaning of life: Metaphysical and Anti-metaphysical Interpretations 
The urge to understand the nature of reality and human life is the very source of 
philosophical thinking. Human beings’ desire to know the structure of reality in order to be able to 
understand, govern, control and direct it has led to the creation of many different philosophical and 
scientific disciplines. Each discipline has a different way of thinking about the nature of reality and 
they use different tools to understand.  
In the history of thought, philosophers dwelt on questions such as what is the nature of 
reality, are our experiences accurate representations of reality, how are human beings a part of 
reality, what is the purpose of human beings in the world, what is the meaning of life, is it 
something to be found in this world or is it something beyond what can be found in the world, what 
is language, what are the limits of human communication, etc. Although these questions seem like 
different inquiries, they are linked to each other: the answer to one question directly affects the 
answer to another question. The nature of reality directly determines the nature of human life and 
its purpose. Ontological problems of reality shape the existential problems of human life. For 
example, the answer to the question of “What is the nature of reality; is this world real or just an 
illusion?” shapes the answer to the question of “what is the meaning of life; is it in this world, or 
beyond this world —e.g. in heaven”. The issues related to human existence are always related to 
issues of the ontological structure of reality. 
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Each philosophical school and each individual philosopher has different interpretations of 
reality. In this thesis, I focus on the existential aspects of reality through an analysis of Nietzsche’s 
and Wittgenstein’s philosophies. Both of these philosophers have an understanding of the 
ontological structure of reality that gives birth to their understanding of human existence. The main 
existential problem, according to my argument concerns the meaning of life, that is, the purpose of 
human existence. If philosophy is the study of human thought and human life —which cannot be 
separated— with all its aspects, then it should talk about the meaning of life. The meaning of life is 
both an aspect of individual human life and an aspect of the culture of one’s society and  should be 
one of the main subjects of philosophy. 
Happiness usually is identified with a meaningful life. One is usually happy if she has a 
meaningful life. To a certain extent I agree with this view. I do not have a precise definition of 
happiness but broadly I think it is the feeling of being comfortable with oneself and one’s life. 
Finding a meaning to life leads to happiness since a meaningful life will make an individual 
comfortable with her life. Thus philosophy has to question what kind of meaning can make an 
individual happy. It is questionable whether the individual reflectively thinks about finding the 
meaning of her life or not. But even if the individual does not reflectively think about the meaning 
of her life, it is certain that everyone is in search for some kind of comfort. A farmer waiting for 
the rain for his crops in a way has an existential concern. He will be happy when it rains. The 
meaning for him at that time is the rain. This is how I perceive the importance of finding a 
meaning in an individual’s life, and it is an existential concern. 
If it is important for everyone to find a meaning, how do we define it?  Is it something of the 
same kind for different individuals, or does it vary even in one individual’s life span? Aristotle says 
that “Happiness belongs to the self-sufficient”; then he says “Different men seek after happiness in 
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different ways and by different means, and so make for themselves different modes of life and 
forms of government” (Aristotle, 335 B.C., p.112). According to Russell “The happiness that is 
genuinely satisfying is accompanied by the fullest exercise of our faculties and the fullest 
realization of the world in which we live” (Russell, 1930, p.54). Nietzsche in the Gay Science in the 
“Joke, Cunning and Revenge” section of the book states that “My Happiness...Since I grew tired of 
the chase, and search, I learned to find; and since the wind blows in my face, I sail with every 
wind.” (GS, par.3). Wittgenstein says “The world of the happy man is a different one from that of 
the unhappy man.” (TLP, 6.43). Elsewhere he says “In order to live happily I must be in agreement 
with the world. And that is what “being happy” means.”(Notebooks, 1916, p.74) 
These different conceptions or definitions of happiness suggest that the understanding of 
and path to happiness are different for each individual, and so too is the path to finding the 
meaning of life. There are two certain facts about human existence: birth and death. The time 
between these two factual events is what we call a human being’s life. In Heideggerian terms, the 
individual is thrown into the world and has to do something with that life. What an individual 
should do in order to find the meaning of life is contingent upon her interpretation of the nature of 
her existence/thrownness; e.g.. if she is a religious believer, she can find happiness in praying, if 
she is a non-believer she can find happiness in dancing or reading. 
There are mainly two interpretations of the nature of reality and human existence which I 
deal with in this thesis. According to one interpretation, the individual is thrown into the world 
from somewhere beyond the world. The purpose of that individual’s existence, according to this 
interpretation, is to try to get in touch with that force beyond the world and her life will be 
meaningful once she does. The individual might have to live in a certain way, to think in a certain 
way, and to behave in a certain way to be able to keep in touch with that beyond-this-world reality 
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but in the end she will receive a reward. In this kind of interpretation, the individual is seen as a 
passive being. Even if she has a freedom to choose the way she lives up to a certain extent she still 
tries to live in conformity with the rules of the beyond-this-world reality. In other words, there is 
not much room left for unlimited freedom of choice. The active force is the beyond-this-world 
reality and it is the reason for everything that happens and can happen in the world. The beyond-
this-world reality is at a higher level and the individual at a lower level. The individual is aware of 
this valuation, but her being at a lower level than the big beyond-this-world reality makes her feel 
secure, guarded, protected, and comfortable. The individual feels at home just by knowing she is 
protected by something higher and stronger. Happiness of the individual lies in this cozy feeling of 
being at home. And yet this feeling rests on a metaphysical interpretation of reality and human 
existence. We can call the comfort that the individual has in thinking that she is embraced by the 
beyond-this-world reality a metaphysical comfort in Nietzsche’s terms.1  
This sort of interpretation is characteristic of religions, where the well-behaved individual 
is rewarded by eternal happiness in another world by God, as well as of the thought of some 
philosophers like Plato, Kant, and Schopenhauer who perceive reality differently from our daily 
experiences in the world. I identify the metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life with any 
kind of dogmatic approach to life. By dogmatic I mean any kind of attitude towards life that is 
single sided, unchanging, rigid which has an authoritarian tenor. For example, a poet who believes 
in the sublimity of the words and writes poems with a single style all the time and closes himself 
off to any other styles, or any other forms of expressions in general, and who thinks that what he is 
doing is the only right form of expression, makes a metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of 
life since he is dogmatic about what he is doing. He, according to my approach, is no different 
                                                 
1.In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche defines the unification of Apollonian and Dionysian forces as metaphysical 
comfort. More will be discussed in the first chapter. 
 4
from a Muslim who does nothing but prays to God at the mosque all the time and believes that his 
faith is the only true faith in the world. 
According to the second interpretation of reality and human existence, the individual is 
thrown into the world but not from beyond-this-world reality. 2 Unlike the metaphysical account, in 
this interpretation the human being creates her own meaning. She is free in her actions and thus is 
responsible for all her deeds, no matter what the outcome is. According to the anti-metaphysical 
interpretation, there is no hierarchy of value: human beings are all at the same level, and there is no 
higher metaphysical reality. Since there is no higher force to protect the individual, or to give her 
the comfort she is seeking the individual has to create that meaning by herself. It is left in the 
individual’s hands to create happiness or unhappiness. On this account the meaning of life lies in 
the individual’s own creation. Unlike the metaphysical interpretation, in this account there is no 
single way to find the meaning of life. The meaning of life lies in this world, in the individual’s 
freedom and creativity. Both the way to create this meaning and the meaning created is unique. 
Each individual follows her own path to attain her meaning. The individual chooses the way she 
behaves, the way she thinks, and the way she lives. There is no set of rules for her to follow. She 
has to decide which ways of thinking, behaving or living will make her happy with herself. This 
interpretation has no room for metaphysical comfort but it has, again in Nietzsche’s terms, this-
worldly comfort. The way to find this-worldly comfort is left to the individual. The individual, left 
without any devices which provide safety —like God, or words, or music— feels the anguish of 
life. She is left alone in this world and has to take care of herself. There is nowhere to hide or feel 
comfortable. Yet, if the individual builds a valuable life by engendering her own meaning, she can 
retain a feeling of being at home. Nevertheless, an anti-metaphysical interpretation of human 
                                                 
2. In this paragraph I use Sartre’s concepts such as freedom and anguish to explain the aspects of the human 
existence. 
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existence and the meaning of life can be ‘terrifying’ since it does not guarantee a certain ground for 
the individual to stand on. The uncertainty can be the source of a good thing or a bad thing 
according to different interpretations. Contrary to a metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of 
life, an anti-metaphysical approach is not dogmatic; it is changing, dynamic, non-authoritative and 
unstable. This characteristic of an anti-metaphysical understanding renders it more resourceful by 
providing a diversity of paths to walk on. 
(ii) Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
There is an interesting similarity between Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches to the 
question of the meaning of life. In this thesis I analyze Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s earlier and 
later thoughts from the perspective of the above two interpretations of reality and the meaning of 
life: the metaphysical and the anti-metaphysical. I argue that in their earlier and later thought, both 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are concerned about human existence and the meaning of life even if 
these concerns are at different levels of explicitness.  
Early Nietzsche is more concerned about the structure of his society and the European 
culture of the time than he is concerned with individual existential concerns, while early 
Wittgenstein tries to shed light on the meaning of life for an individual by analyzing the connection 
between language and reality, and he tries to establish an ethical framework which he envisages as 
constituting the meaning of life. In their earlier thoughts they both have a metaphysical 
interpretation of human existence and the meaning of life and in their later period, while still 
having existential concerns, they take an anti-metaphysical stance in their analysis of the nature of 
existence and the meaning of life. My claim is that the break between the first publication of 
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy and the second publication of the same book with the preface 
“Attempt at a Self-Criticism”, which is in accordance with his arguments in Human-All-Too-
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Human, is in certain respects of the same nature as the break in Wittgenstein’s philosophy between 
the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations.  
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche criticizes European culture for worshipping either God 
or science.  The real values of human existence are being undermined by European culture’s 
obsession with Christianity or science. He perceives the culture of his age as being on the brink of 
a complete disruption. Christianity, by providing a God as a ruler of being beyond and above all 
existences urges people seek meaning outside this world. The individual is not free to create her 
own meaning; she is forced to be a passive individual who just follows the pre-established rules. 
This causes despair in human beings since they have the idea that there cannot be good things done 
in this world so everything should be left to the other world. With the ongoing wars in Europe at 
that time, people were more inclined to believe that the real meaning of life would be in the other 
world. Nietzsche comprehends this outlook as nihilistic and criticizes the culture for having such a 
nihilistic perspective (WP, BT).  
Nihilism means “That the highest values are losing their value. There is no bourne. There is 
no answer to the question: to what purpose” (WP1, p.8). According to Nietzsche, Christian 
morality is a remedy for nihilism since it provides a meaning that lies beyond this world and since 
it tells us the means to attain that meaning. But this causes degradation to society since in this way 
of thinking, everything is put off to be dealt with in another world, and human beings are 
comprehended as passive beings. But it is not only Christianity that leads to the disruption of 
society: replacement of the Old God with science is also a significant danger facing European 
culture. Modern science is then seen as a cult providing unchangeable truths and values. In both 
ways of thinking—religious or scientific—there is a danger of fixation on only one aspect of life 
and undermining the other aspects. This dogmatic attitude is a kind of nihilism according to 
Nietzsche. A human being’s trust of herself is lost, and human reason or science only seen as a 
 7
justification of life, as providing meaning. He states that nihilism can only be an intermediary 
pathological state, from which emerges a rejuvenation of ideas or total decadence of the culture 
(WP1, section 1). His task as a philosopher is to find ways to lead European society away from this 
condition. 
In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche, conceives ancient Greek culture as sublime and perfect, 
and tries to explain the creation of this sublime culture in order to provide some remedies to the 
European culture’s nihilistic sickness. He shows Greek art as a measure of the sublimity of Greek 
culture and accounts for the uniqueness of Greek art and culture. The reason for sublime Greek 
culture is the tension between and yet the unity of the two main forces, Apollonian and Dionysian. 
Apollo and Dionysus are two mythological gods who contain opposite powers. The tension 
between them creates art and art is the meaning of life. The unity of these opposing powers is 
called primordial unity —Ur-Eine— and it is the metaphysical essence of the world. Primordial 
unity is the source of art. 
This is a metaphysical approach to the meaning of life, in other words the meaning is found 
in a so-called unity of abstract powers, not in this world. Nietzsche in his “Attempt at a Self-
Criticism” preface to The Birth of Tragedy admits that he created an artist’s metaphysics in the 
book. He says that he created another kind of god by placing the Ur-Eine at the center of the 
meaning of life. He suggests that the metaphysical approach of the book reveals hatred against “the 
now” and thus places the meaning of life beyond this time beyond this world (SC, p.25). Instead he 
now says that individuals should learn this-worldly comfort first, should start to see the everyday 
details and beauties of life. His new approach to the meaning of life is an anti-metaphysical 
approach; he grounds the meaning of this world in everyday life. Meaning can be found not only 
by an artist but by any individual on the street. 
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Wittgenstein’s conception of the meaning of life changes in his later philosophy in a similar 
way to Nietzsche’s. The Tractatus has a semantic account that goes hand in hand with the 
existential account. Wittgenstein tries to explain the relationship between language and reality. For 
this purpose first he makes a metaphysical explanation of reality and defines language as a means 
to describe the nature of this reality. He holds the picture theory of meaning, according to which 
the meaning of a word is the correspondent object and the meaning of a proposition is the 
correspondent fact in the world. In this sense, language cannot state anything other than the facts. 
There is a metaphysical essence of the world —the mystical— but it cannot be stated by the 
language. The mystical —logic, ethics, aesthetics and religion— is at a higher level whereas the 
world and language are at the lower level. Because of this value hierarchy language is not capable 
of stating metaphysical truths. His discussion of linguistic meaning is not separate from his 
discussion of existential meaning. I believe that linguistic meaning and existential meaning are 
ultimately the same thing in Wittgenstein’s thought. He tries to sketch the metaphysical essence of 
the world clearly. He deals with problems like the individual’s place in the world, happiness, and 
the value of life from a semantic perspective. If analyzed clearly with the help of his Notebooks, 
the existential agenda of the Tractatus becomes more explicit. 
 In his later philosophy he keeps treating the semantic problems but does not explicitly spell 
out his arguments on existential meaning. In Philosophical Investigations he argues that in the 
Tractatus he made some grave mistakes concerning the nature of language and reality and he tries 
to fix those grave mistakes in his later account (PI, preface, p.x). He develops a criticism of the 
picture theory of meaning and defines language as a part of human activity which is the main 
principle of human communication and life. Language in his new perspective is an aspect of 
human life and existence, it is not abstract. Language not only makes descriptions but enables 
communication. In this thesis, by referring to Wittgenstein’s criticisms against the semantic 
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account of the Tractatus I give a reading of Philosophical Investigations that reveals its existential 
account. Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, explicitly provides arguments against the 
semantic aspect of the Tractatus, but does not spell out anything against his previous existential 
account —parallel to the semantic account— explicitly, but I will infer his new existential 
arguments by using his critique of the grave mistakes of the semantic account of the Tractatus as a 
guide. 
There is an interesting similarity between the shift in Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s 
interpretations of the meaning of life, and this similarity is the main subject of this thesis. In their 
early period, they both have a metaphysical approach to the nature of reality, human existence and 
the meaning of life. They both have a value hierarchy. In Nietzsche the Primordial Unity is what is 
higher and in Wittgenstein the Mystical is what is higher. They both start to philosophize as a 
response to the values of their age. They both argue against scientism. In their later period, they 
both get rid of a value hierarchy and approach the meaning of life from an anti-metaphysical 
perspective. 
I find this kinship interesting since Wittgenstein’s early philosophy influenced the Vienna 
Circle and helped form the logical positivism of the 1920’s and 30’s. The subject of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy —language, logic and linguistic meaning— is the main subject of Analytic Philosophy. 
Thus Wittgenstein is one of the most influential philosophers of Analytic Philosophy. On the other 
hand Nietzsche is one of the most important figures of Continental Philosophy. The main subject 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy is human existence, culture and the individual’s place in the world. I 
believe that, even though these two philosophers belong to two allegedly opposite philosophical 
streams, the subject matter of their philosophies are similar. Both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein were 
concerned about similar subjects, viz., human existence, the human being’s place in the world and 
the nature of reality.  The difference is in the methods they use. Wittgenstein is more focused on 
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linguistic meaning explicitly, which, as I see it, he did not consider as distinct from existential 
meaning whereas Nietzsche explicitly developed ideas concerning human existence and existential 
meaning. They, in other words provide different perspectives on the same subject matter: 
existential meaning.  
(iii) Recent Discussions on the link between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
Although there are very few attempts to analyze a link between Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy I am not the first person to find such a connection.3 One of the works on 
the link between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein’s thoughts is written by Eric Heller in his essay called 
“Nietzsche and Wittgenstein” in his book The Importance of Nietzsche. He first talks about the 
family resemblances between Wittgenstein and the main figures of Vienna Modernism like 
Weininger, Loos, Kraus, Musil and Schonberg in order to explain the cultural atmosphere in which 
Wittgenstein was raised. Heller emphasizes the similarities between Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s personalities while comparing the development of their thoughts. He suggests that 
Wittgenstein resembles Nietzsche; 
In his homelessness, his restless wanderings, his perpetual search for exactly the right conditions in 
which to work, his loneliness, his ascetism, his need for affection and his shyness in giving it, his 
intellectual extremism, which drove thought to the borders of insanity, the elasticity of his style, and...in 
one philosophically most important respect, like Nietzsche, he knew that philosophical opinion was not 
merely a matter of logically demonstrable right or wrong...it was above all a matter of authenticity 
(Heller, 1988, p.143-144). 
 
 Although I agree with Heller that there are striking similarities between Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s personalities based on my readings of Wittgenstein’s notebooks and Nietzsche’s 
autobiography, I do not focus on these aspects since I would like to examine their similarity from a 
philosophical perspective. I do think that there is a strong relationship between a philosopher’s 
                                                 
3 In their essay ‘ Nietzsche and Wittgenstein: Philosophers of Future’, Michael Peters and James Marshall argue 
that the reason for the absence of the analysis of the link between Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophy is 
the late reception of Nietzsche’s works in Anglo- American philosophy. It was primarily Walter Kaufmann who 
introduced Nietzsche to Anglo-American Philosophy in the post-war period (1950). But originally his reception 
was literary rather than philosophical (Marshall, Peters, 1999, p.34-36) 
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personality and his works. I do not, however, intend to look into the implications of the 
psychological aspects of their personalities for their thoughts.4  
Heller makes a striking claim which helped me shape this thesis:  
The break between Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations is of the same kind as that between 
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (1871) and his Human, All Too Human (1879). In both cases it was 
brought about by the abnegation of metaphysics, the loss of faith in any pre-established correspondence 
between, on the one hand, the logic of our thought and language, and, on the other hand, the “logic” of 
Reality. In the course of those eight years stretching from The Birth of Tragedy to Human, All Too 
Human, Nietzsche came to believe that he had freed himself of this “philosophical prejudice” —which he 
diagnosed  as the prejudice vitiating the whole history of thought— by turning (to use Wittgenstein’s 
obviously autobiographical words from Investigations) his “whole examination round”. It is no 
exaggeration to say Nietzsche could have written this (Heller, 1988, p.149). 
 
I shaped my thesis by the influence of this claim. I also include Nietzsche’s preface to the 
second edition of The Birth of Tragedy “Attempt at a Self Criticism” while looking into his 
Human, All too Human, since both of them were published around the same time and in both of 
them Nietzsche criticizes his earlier thought. I analyze the break with a focus on their approach to 
existential meaning.  
Heller believes that both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share a similar nihilism in their later 
thought. This nihilism “will one day be seen as an integral part of the tragically self-destructive 
design of European thought” (Heller,1988, p.145). Both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, in their later 
thought, Heller believes, deny all categorical certainties which have been allowed to determine the 
body of traditional philosophy (Heller, 1988, p.150). Wittgenstein’s and Nietzsche’s “creative 
distrust of all certainties”, Nietzsche’s announcing the death of God, and Wittgenstein’s giving up 
the sublimation of logic still leave many questions around their notion of “existential meaning”. 
According to both philosophers’ argument, neither God, nor science, nor logic, nor the spirit of 
                                                 
4 In this context I am highly influenced by Louis Sass’s essay named “Deep Disquietudes: Reflections on 
Wittgenstein as Antiphilosopher” in which he analyzes Wittgenstein’s works by focusing on his personality. He 
illuminates Wittgenstein’s works by looking into their existential, psychological and cultural implications, and by 
connecting these with his personality and cultural milieu. This essay helped me to understand Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy in a broader respect and I found it really useful in terms of linking Wittgenstein’s thought to 
Nietzsche’s. Sass looks into his philosophy by referring to a schizoid personality disorder, which he thinks that 
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language can be viewed as the meaning of life (Heller, 1988, p.150). Heller is afraid that this 
groundless approach to life will lead to pessimism. He concludes that Wittgenstein’s statement 
“What is the aim in philosophy? —To show the fly out of the fly-bottle” (PI 309) hides a kind of 
nihilism. He responds: 
But who asks? Who answers? And who is the fly? It is an unholy trinity; the three are one. This way lies 
no way out. This way lays only fly-bottles, and more and more fly bottles. (Heller, 1988, p.157) 
 
I agree with Heller’s claim about the similarity of the break in Nietzsche’s and in 
Wittgenstein’s thought. In their earlier thought they both accepted a higher level of reality and 
argued that higher reality is the ground of everything. In Wittgenstein’s case, this higher reality 
was the mystical —ethics, logic, aesthetics, religion. Logic was the common scaffolding of reality, 
world and language. Logic was what is sublime.5 There was a strong demand for perfect order and 
this order was logic. Later Wittgenstein denounced this theory. Instead of looking for a perfect 
order of logic in the analysis of the language-world relationship, he started his analysis of language 
by looking at human experience. He gave up the idea of a sublime logic. In a similar way, early 
Nietzsche defined reality with reference to two art deities, Apollo and Dionysus. Before science 
appeared, according to Nietzsche, those two artistic deities were forming a primordial unity, which 
was the main source of sublime Greek art and culture. There was a perfect order of the world 
through the balancing powers of these two art deities. Later Nietzsche announced that his theory 
was nothing but an artist’s metaphysics and argued that the meaning does not lie in the harmony of 
the primordial unity but rather it takes place as a part of everyday reality. In a similar way to 
                                                                                                                                                
Wittgenstein had. This essay made me think about Nietzsche’s autobiography Ecce Homo and I found significant 
family resemblances between Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s personalities. 
5 The central use of the word ‘sublimate’ is a chemical one. The verb ‘to sublime’ refers to the ability of dry ice at 
room temperature to change directly from solid to gaseous state, without passing through the liquid state.  
Wittgenstein uses the word in Philosophical Investigations as “…tendency to sublime the logic of our language 
—as we might put it”(PI, par.38) to criticize his earlier notion of logic as the scaffolding of reality. Wittgenstein 
uses the term to mean “making something of higher value, transcending the limits of the world”. Following him, I 
use the word sublime to refer to these notions. 
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Wittgenstein he gave up the sublime account of Greek culture. In this context Heller’s claim of the 
similarity is true, however I do not agree with his conclusion. Rather I think their later thoughts are 
offering possible responses to nihilism. Nietzsche conceives nihilism as a pathological stage that 
an individual or a society goes through and he as a philosopher recommends the ways to get out of 
it. The solution is not fixation into one aspect of life —science or god— but rather looking for 
multiple truths and meanings. Wittgenstein, in a similar vein, by introducing the multiplicity of 
language games and forms of life introduces the multiple meanings of life. I argue that Nietzsche’s 
and Wittgenstein’s later thoughts do not lead thinkers to pessimism since with these different 
approaches we have more paths to follow in order to find the meaning of life. Both philosophers 
emphasize the importance of the actual life we live everyday, and they both think that life has the 
resources to provide multiple meanings. 
Meredith Williams in her essay “Transcendence and Return: The Overcoming of 
Philosophy in Nietzsche and Wittgenstein” argues against Heller. She does not agree with Heller 
that the break in their philosophy is similar: 
Though both adopt the aphoristic style, the tone and affect of each is quite different...Though both adopt 
diagnosis as their distinctive way of dealing with problems, Nietzsche’s method of genealogy is 
psychological and historical, whereas Wittgenstein’s  method is grammatical and conceptual. Finally, 
though both seek to overcome the philosophic tradition, their attitudes towards what both hold to be 
overcome are by no means identical...for Nietzsche, the problem is social and cultural —contemporary 
society is deceased, is decadent...For Wittgenstein, the problem is personal —the individual is in the 
grip of illness. (Williams, 1988, p.403) 
 
I agree with Williams that they have a similar style of writing —in aphorisms— but I do 
not agree with her claims about the difference in the contents of their thoughts. Concerning their 
method, I argue, Nietzsche’s is also grammatical and conceptual while Wittgenstein’s 
interpretation of language in his later period is existential (language is a part of natural history of 
human existence). Also, both Wittgenstein’s earlier and later thoughts have existential 
implications, so the problem for him was social and cultural as well. His arguments in 
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Philosophical Investigations have many cultural implications: he discusses language games and 
forms of life in that context.  
In his book Self and World in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, Christopher Janaway analyses 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and its influence in the history of philosophy. In the book there is a 
section called “Remarks on Wittgenstein and Nietzsche” where he explains the influence of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy on Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s thought. He does not explicitly link 
Wittgenstein’s thought to Nietzsche’s thought. He says, however, that Schopenhauer’s thought 
influenced both of them. He looks into Schopenhauer’s view of the individual sub specie 
aeternitatis and its influence on the Tractatus and The Birth of Tragedy, and how Wittgenstein and 
Nietzsche have the same perspective on the self as Schopenhauer. I agree with Janaway that 
Schopenhauer is influential in their thoughts. Early Wittgenstein’s solipsism and early Nietzsche’s 
conception of the individual sub specie aeternitatis are very similar to each other since they were 
both influenced by Schopenhauer.  However, I will not discuss his influence on their early 
philosophies even though I think it is one of the many reasons for the similarity between them.  
Gordon Bearn in his book Waking to Wonder: Wittgenstein’s Existential Investigations, 
discusses the similarity of the break in Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s thoughts. His starting point 
is Heller’s claim about the similarity between the trends of their respective thoughts, but Bearn 
does not read them as contributing to the nihilism of contemporary culture. Rather, he interprets 
Wittgenstein’s and Nietzsche’s later thoughts as providing a rest from our existential anxieties and 
nihilistic tendencies. Their later thoughts “wake us to the wonder of existence”: 
The second time round I realized that Heller and I look at this congruence of two philosophies from 
rather different directions. Heller finds in the later Wittgenstein the same disastrous turn from 
“metaphysics” that the mature Nietzsche also manifests. According to Heller if, “European thought and 
history continue” it will be due to some “miracle” (Heller, p.149). And he insinuates that this miracle is 
simply the miracle that the influence of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein would disappear....According to 
Heller, Wittgenstein and Nietzsche are indeed linked philosophers: they share credit for starting the dry 
rot of contemporary thought and culture. (Bearn, 1997, preface, p 15) 
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He continues: 
Although I agree with Heller that Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophical developments trace the 
same arc, I do not see these two as exacerbating the nihilism of contemporary culture. Quite the reverse, 
I read them as providing a rest for that nihilistic anxiety described by Schopenhauer and indicated by 
Cavell. They aim to ease our existential cares, waking us to the wonder of existence, the wonder of 
human communication, the wonder of human satisfaction. Nietzsche and Wittgenstein point the way to 
a precarious peace, an earthly peace. This, in any case, is where I will argue Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
end up. I will also argue that it is not where they began. This book defends Heller’s thesis that 
Wittgenstein’s turn is helpfully understood in terms of Nietzsche’s turn. But unlike Heller’s, this 
defense is thorough; and unlike Heller’s this defense is sympathetic to the movement of Wittgenstein’s 
and Nietzsche’s writing (Bearn, 1997, preface, p.15).  
 
In this book, Bearn presents the development of Wittgenstein’s thought in a Nietzschean 
perspective. He interprets the later thoughts of the two philosophers as providing a respite for our 
nihilistic anxieties. He says that both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein aim to ease our existential 
concerns by “waking us to the wonder of existence, the wonder of human communication, the 
wonder of human satisfaction” (Bearn, 1997, preface p.15). His main focus is to show how the 
later thoughts of both philosophers lead to psychological peace. Both philosophers, according to 
Bearn, write in response to what Nietzsche calls “nihilism” and what Wittgenstein calls “the 
darkness of this time” (Bearn, 1997, p.36). They both speak of their goals as achieving a kind of 
peace. Bearn further claims that Wittgenstein, like Nietzsche, showed a development from a 
metaphysical way to an anti-metaphysical way to peace.6
For what I discovered was that Nietzsche’s development, his turn from the position articulated in The 
Birth of Tragedy (1872) provides a fine model of Wittgenstein’s development, his turn from the position 
articulated in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (c. 1918). Mine is a Nietzschean reading of Wittgenstein 
(Bearn, 1997, x) 
 
Bearn’s book highly influenced the composition of this thesis. My ideas related to the 
subject are shaped by my reading of Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s books from the perspective 
that Bearn provides. Bearn’s book helped me to focus my ideas on the existential implications of 
                                                 
6 Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, talks about peace in philosophy. Logic was perceived to be the 
perfect order that achieves complete clarity in language. Wittgenstein, criticizing that view says that the real 
discovery is the one that will bring philosophy peace so that it will not be tormented by questions which are 
themselves questionable. However, the way to peace is not through logic, rather there are different methods, like 
different therapies (PI, par.133). Bearn gives an existential interpretation of this statement. 
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their works. I mainly focus on the change in the concept of meaning —existential meaning— in 
early and later Wittgenstein and Nietzsche. My notion of the meaning of life is being comfortable 
with one’s own self and life and I perceive what Bearn calls peace as a “peace with life and one’s 
own self”. So my claims about their conceptions of the meaning of life are parallel to Bearn’s 
claims about the peace they provide for our existential anxieties. In terms of content, my work is 
more a Wittgensteinian reading of Nietzsche. I approach the break between Nietzsche’s early and 
later philosophies from the perspective of the nature of the break between the Tractatus and 
Philosophical Investigations. For example, I use the Tractatus’s higher/ lower distinction between 
the mystical and the world in order to explain early Nietzsche’s conception of the meaning of life 
as in the heart of the primordial unity. In a similar way, Wittgenstein’s notion of form of life, 
which emphasizes the centrality of human experience, makes me think about later Nietzsche’s 
admiration of the beauty of the admittedly superficial structure of the Greek society for its 
simplicity and arbitrariness.  
Bearn makes a detailed comparison of Wittgenstein’s early and later thoughts and finds one 
to one links between the two philosophers’ early and later works. Unlike Bearn, I do not go into 
details of the similarity between their works. I look at the similarity of the development in their 
understanding of the meaning of life from a broader perspective. Nor do I go into a detailed 
discussion of the correspondences between the writings of the works of the two philosophers. 
Bearn also emphasizes the influence of Tolstoy’s works on Wittgenstein’s earlier thought but 
again, I do not include these historico-literary influences in my analysis. Even though I did not 
include these points into my discussion, they shed light on the construction of this thesis. I owe 
great thanks to Bearn’s book for being the primary inspiration for my thesis. 
  The latest article on the Nietzsche-Wittgenstein link is by James Marshall and Michael 
Peters in their book Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Postmodernism, Pedagogy. The title of the essay 
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related to Nietzsche and Wittgenstein is “Nietzsche and Wittgenstein: Philosophers of The Future” 
and concerns the educational and pedagogical implications of Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s 
thoughts. In this essay, after looking at the history of the analysis of Nietzsche- Wittgenstein link, 
they claim that there is a historical connection between Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s works. 
They argue that a historico-cultural reading of Wittgenstein would enable us to see the connection 
between their thoughts since Wittgenstein’s work is highly influenced by Viennese Modernism, an 
intellectual environment that is strongly shaped by Nietzsche: 
…Nietzsche’s work was, in effect, part of the shared intellectual background against which 
Wittgenstein crystallized his own ideas. We invoke the French concept of an energetics to explain a 
pervasive and background cultural influence of Nietzsche upon Wittgenstein. There is also clear 
historical evidence that Wittgenstein read Nietzsche and that he grew up in the company of 
intellectuals strongly influenced by Nietzsche, including the musician Gustav Mahler and the painter 
Gustav Klimt, both of whom were regular visitors to the Wittgenstein family mansion. In a more 
indirect historical sense, Wittgenstein was influenced by the Nietzschean, Oswald Spengler, and both 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein (perhaps more so than any other two modern philosophers) were strongly 
influenced by Schopenhauer. (Marshall and Peters, 1999, p.35) 
 
They talk further about the influence of Spengler on Wittgenstein’s thoughts on culture 
arguing that Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblance’ is similar to what Spengler calls an 
‘ursymbol’. Wittgenstein, like Spengler —and thus Nietzsche— has a romantic view of culture 
according to which the individual is a cultural being and human life emerges through culture. In 
other words, according to this view, the individual is seen as the producer and the production of 
culture (Marshall and Peters, 1999, p.44).7
The second claim of Marshall and Peters is that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy has some 
family resemblances with some aspects of Nietzsche’s works. These resemblances are first the 
notion of philosopher as a cultural physician in Nietzsche’s philosophy and second the notion of 
the philosopher of the future, a phrase that Nietzsche continuously uses in his works. Between 
1872 and 1875, after the first publication of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche starts working on The 
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Last Philosophy, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, and The Philosopher as a Cultural 
Physician.8  In these works, Nietzsche is concerned with the notion of culture in the age of science 
and he tries to define the cultural significance of the philosopher. Since, in the age of science, all 
the previously established ideals are in a process of transformation,9 the philosopher should act like 
a physician and prepare the solid ground of culture and create new values as the philosopher artist. 
In order to succeed, the philosopher must first turn her own life into a work of art. Nietzsche’s 
notion of the cultural physician is the source of his concept of the philosopher of the future. The 
philosopher of the future should be an artist who creates new values for the culture. According to 
Nietzsche’s argument, the philosopher of the future is responsible for the education of humanity as 
a whole. Referring to this they further state:  
The philosopher-physician does not create cultural health by treating the sick individual, by, for 
instance enhancing his or her rational autonomy. The cultural malady is not primarily a cognitive 
disorder that, thus, can be cured by reason alone. The philosopher of the future employs all the cultural 
resources at his or her disposal to promote what we are capable of being, Wittgenstein ascribes to a 
similar romantic view of culture as a form of life; culture as an expressive and natural force, one that 
begins in doing (rather than thinking), and can be judged in terms of similar creation of a work of art. 
Wittgenstein also sees himself as a philosopher of culture and philosophy as a kind of therapy (Marshall 
and Peters, 1999, p.35). 
 
Thus they argue, both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein perceive philosophy as a kind of therapy, 
and the philosopher as the person to cure the illness. Claiming that there are different kinds of 
therapies to cure the illnesses of understanding, Wittgenstein, according to their claim, resembles 
Nietzsche’s conception of the philosopher as a physician.  
Although I acknowledge the possible historical connection between the thoughts of 
Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, I do not focus on this historical link in my thesis. I agree to some 
extent with Marshall and Peters’s claim about the similarity between Nietzsche’s notion of the 
                                                                                                                                                
7 Peters and Marshall argue that the Romantic view of culture is a countermovement to the Enlightenment view 
according to which the essence of the individual is reason and the culture is a product of reason, rather than a 
production of human interaction and communication (ibid., p.44). 
8 This time corresponds to the earlier period of Nietzsche’s thought. 
9 This refers to his criticism of European society; replacing the Old God with new science. 
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philosopher as a cultural physician and Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as a cure for 
illnesses of the understanding. However I want to emphasize that Nietzsche’s notion of the 
philosopher as a cultural physician who will create new values for the society is a thought he had 
in his earlier philosophy, where he was subliming art as a justification of life. The notion of an 
artist-philosopher is a metaphysical one since it sublimes the artist as providing the purpose of 
culture. In Nietzsche’s words it is ‘artist’s metaphysics’, which he came to reject in his later 
thought. In his “Attempt at a Self-Criticism”, he criticized the artists’ metaphysics he created in the 
first edition of The Birth of Tragedy. Even though there can be found some family resemblances 
between Nietzsche’s notion of the philosopher as a cultural physician and Wittgenstein’s 
conception of the philosopher in his later thought, it is important to note that Nietzsche’s cultural 
physician embodies a metaphysical approach to the task of the philosopher almost referring to the 
philosopher as a God. Wittgenstein’s conception of therapies is not metaphysical, in fact just the 
opposite since he talks about the multiplicity of therapies rather than only one kind of therapy such 
as art in early Nietzsche’s sense. Nietzsche’s conception of the philosopher as cultural physician is 
metaphysical, thus he is not on the same line with Wittgenstein in this sense (PI, par.133). 
In Culture and Value there are two entries related to Nietzsche, which confirm that 
Wittgenstein read Nietzsche. In 1931, Wittgenstein says: 
There are problems I never get anywhere near, which do not lie in my path or are not part of my world. 
Problems of the intellectual world of the West that Beethoven (and perhaps Goethe to a certain extent) 
tackled and wrestled with, but which no philosopher has ever confronted (Perhaps Nietzsche passed by 
them). And perhaps they are lost as far as western philosophy is concerned, i.e. no one will be there 
capable of experiencing, and hence describing, the progress of this culture as an epic. Or more precisely, 
it just no longer is an epic, or is so only for someone looking at it from outside, which is perhaps what 
Beethoven did with prevision (as Spengler hints somewhere). It might be said that civilization can only 
have its epic poets in advance. Just as a man cannot report his death when it happens, but only foresee it 
and describe it as something lying in the future. Do, it might be said: If you want to see an epic 
description of a whole culture, you will have to look at the works of its greatest figures, hence at works 
composed when the end of this culture could only be foreseen, because later on there will be nobody left 
to describe it. So it’s not to be wondered at that it should only be written in the obscure language of 
prophecy, comprehensible to very few indeed (CV, p.9) 
 
Then in another entry in 1947 he says: 
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Nietzsche writes somewhere that even the best poets and thinkers have written stuff that is mediocre and 
bad, but have separated off the good material. But it is not quite like that. It’s true that a gardener, along 
with his roses, keeps manure and rubbish and straw in his garden, but what distinguishes them is not just 
their value, but mainly their function in the garden. Something that looks like a bad sentence can be the 
germ of a good one (CV, p.59).10
 
It is evident that Wittgenstein read Nietzsche; it is also evident that in some of their 
writings they used the same expressions and similes. But I do not intend to claim that Wittgenstein 
was influenced by Nietzsche and produced his works accordingly, since this claim is beyond the 
scope of my thesis. I primarily want to look into the striking turn in their thoughts related to the 
meaning of life. Apart from any possible historical link between the two philosophers, this claim 
can be persuasively made out. 
In my first chapter I analyze the break in Nietzsche’s philosophy between The Birth of 
Tragedy, and the same publication of the same book with a preface called “Attempt at a Self 
Criticism” to show that the turn in Nietzsche’s conception of meaning of life is from a 
metaphysical perspective of the perception of reality and human existence to an anti-metaphysical 
one. This chapter gives a detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s metaphysics. 
In my second chapter I analyze the break in Wittgenstein’s philosophy between the 
Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations with a focus on the difference of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy from the logical positivists. I show that, like Nietzsche’s turn, Wittgenstein’s thought 
shifted from a metaphysical interpretation of reality and human existence to an anti-metaphysical 
interpretation.  
                                                 
10 This writing that Wittgenstein is referring to is a section from Human All Too Human:; “Belief in inspiration: 
Artists have an interest in the existence of a belief in the sudden occurrence of ideas, in so-called inspirations; as 
though the idea of a work of art, a poem, the basic proposition of a philosophy flashed down from heaven like a 
ray of divine grace. In reality, the imagination of a good artist or thinker is productive continually, of old, 
mediocre and bad things, but his power of judgment, sharpened and practiced to the highest degree, rejects, 
selects, knots together; as we can now see from Beethoven’s notebooks how the most glorious melodies were put 
together gradually and as it were culled out of many beginnings. He who selects less rigorously and likes to give 
himself up to his imitative memory can, under the right circumstances, become a great improviser; but artistic 
improvisation is something very inferior in relation to the serious and carefully fashioned artistic idea. All the 
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In the conclusion I compare Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s interpretations of human 
existence and the meaning of life and show the similarities between their approaches both in their 
earlier and later periods of thoughts. I also emphasize the significance of the similarity of their 
respective approaches to the meaning of life.
                                                                                                                                                
great artists have been great workers, inexhaustible not only iinvention but also in rejecting, sifting, transforming, 
ordering (HH, I, par.155).” 
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1. CHAPTER 1: NIETZSCHE 
(i) Introductory Remarks 
In 1872, Nietzsche published The Birth of Tragedy, with the subtitle: Out of the Spirit of 
Music. Towards the end of 1885, after he finsihed writing Thus Spoke Zarathustra and while 
working on Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche decided to publish new prefaces for his previous 
works (Bearn, 1997, p. 5). Thus, mostly in 1886 he published a number of prefaces for his previous 
works including a preface to Birth of Tragedy called “An Attempt at a Self-Criticism” and the 
book was published with a new subtitle The Birth of Tragedy: Hellenism and Pessimism which 
enunciated Nietzsche's own critical reflections on his earlier work. He considered the prefaces as a 
whole, reflecting his point of view at that time. Walter Kauffman in his book Nietzsche: 
Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, translates a letter written by Nietzsche to Fritzsch: 
Pehaps it would be equally useful to issue now, immediately, also the new edition of The Birth (with the 
Attempt at a Self- Criticism).This “Attempt” together with the Preface to Human, All-Too Human 
provides genuine enlightenment about me —the very best preparation for my audacious son, 
Zarathustra (Kaufmann, p.466). 
 
Nietzsche’s main focus in the Birth of Tragedy is the meaning of life. He tries to find an 
answer to the question of the purpose of human existence by aiming to establish a justification for 
life. In the first edition of the Birth of Tragedy, he has a pessimistic and a nihilistic outlook on the 
subject. His main argument is that the world can only be justified as an artistic phenomenon. Greek 
Society, he states, by finding the true way of living established a magnificent Greek Culture (BT, 
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p.17). Nietzsche gives a metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life in the Birth of Tragedy 
by suggesting that a meaningful life would be the one that takes art as a grounding of life. The 
problem of European culture for Nietzsche, is its distance from this aesthetic phenomenon. 
However, in his later period Nietzsche changes his point of view. He approaches the meaning of 
life from an anti-metaphysical perspective. 
Nietzsche, in his thought had three periods. In his early writings, like The Birth of Tragedy, 
he has a metaphysical approach to existential problems even though he criticizes Christianity and 
the worship of science in his age. In his middle period with books like Human-All-Too-Human, 
and Joyful Wisdom he criticizes his early metaphysical approach to the meaning of life and starts to 
talk about existential concerns with an anti-metaphysical tone of voice. However, in his later works 
like Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Daybreak he starts to create metaphysics of a higher human being 
—away from the individual on the street. This thesis focuses on his early and middle writings and 
the shift in his thinking with a comparison to Wittgenstein’s. I will call his middle period “later 
Nietzsche” for the sake of clarity in the thesis. 
In the following sections, I shall first provide a short review of Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
Then I shall look into Nietzsche’s earlier thought with an analysis of the Birth of Tragedy. Then I 
shall make an analysis of his later thought by focusing on the preface he later wrote to the Birth of 
Tragedy, which criticizes his early thought as well as some parts of Human All Too Human. My 
analyses shall be from the perspective of his approach to the meaning of life. My main argument is 
that his approach to the meaning of life changed from a metaphysical account to an anti-
metaphysical one.  
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  (ii) A preview of Nietzsche’s thought  
The following positions Nietzsche takes did not basically change during his life time. 
However, the alternatives he provided to what he saw as problematic changed drastically and this 
is what I focus on in this chapter.  
The Birth of Tragedy sets forth an alternative conception to the late 18th and early 19th  
century understanding of Greek culture which acknowledges ancient Greece as the archetype of 
noble simplicity and rational serenity. Nietzsche views his own century as being on the brink of a 
complete disruption and dislocation and the very foundations of Western Culture to be  
undermined.  
For two milennia God served as the creative source of all being, truth and moral value, 
however according to Nietzsche, with the latest developments in science, theism was no longer 
credible to educated Europeans. For many centuries, Christian morality, by promising a better 
world beyond this world, put people to sleep and encouraged them to accept whatever is the case. 
It did not stimulate the society to make changes. In the age of Enlightenment, and the governance 
of the scientific approach to life and reality, the traditional values of Christianity were no longer 
valid. Nietzsche announces the death of God: 
The madman: Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the 
market place and cried incessantly: "I seek God! I seek God!" ——As many of those who did not believe 
in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he 
lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? 
emigrated? ——Thus they yelled and laughed. The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them 
with his eyes. "Whither is God?" he cried. "I will tell you. We have killed him——you and I. All of us are 
his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe 
away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it 
moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, 
sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an 
infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night 
continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we not hear nothing as 
yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine 
decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him 
(Nietzsche, GS, par.125). 
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 What does the death of God mean? There are two aspects of the death of God in 
Nietzsche’s view. First, since there is no longer a ruler of being, values or truth, human nature has 
been in a new state of becoming in a de-deified world which gave birth to Renaissance Humanism 
and Enlightenment. Human beings were then free to create a world as they wish without 
boundaries and without pre-determined truths and moral values. The second aspect, is the danger 
of the replacement of the Old God with modern science and industrial revolution. Modern science, 
the offspring of the human recognition of reason, is now beginning to be seen as a cult, an 
unchangeble and undeniable truth which also gets applied to the understanding of truth itself as 
well as to moral values.11 Fixation on one perspective on life —a scientific one— is for Nietzsche 
a danger since this obsession brings forth single-mindedness, another type of God (Ackermann, 
1990, p.18-32). 
Now that God is dead, modern science is a threat since it constructs a narrow-minded 
approach to reality and meaning. There is a danger of science being dogmatic. Nietzsche 
disapproves of this tendency as well. Both religion and science, since they directed people to a 
dogmatic approach to life, led to the nihilism of his age and European society, in order to create a 
well-rooted culture, had to get rid of this nihilistic stage. The term ‘nihilism’ is used in different 
contexts in Nietzsche’s works and sometimes the meaning of the term is ambiguous. I will use his 
definition of nihilism in his Will to Power since that concept of nihilism is in conformity with his 
critique of European culture in the Birth of Tragedy:  
1. Nihilism as an outcome of the valuations and interpretations of existence which have prevailed 
heretofore. 
                                                 
11 Nietzsche’s attitude against Christianity, traditional metaphysics and science did not change throughout his 
philosophy. The main difference between his Birth of Tragedy and his middle period works is that while he 
creates another kind of metaphysics in the Birth of Tragedy, he challenges that metaphysical approach in his later 
works. Since his approach towards religion and science did not change I use his arguments in the Will to Power 
and Joyful Wisdom in order to explain his attitude even though the Will To Power is a later period work. 
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2. What does nihilism mean? —That the highest values are losing their value. There is no bourne. There 
is no answer to the question: “to what purpose?” 
3. Thorough nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd, in the light of the highest values already 
discovered; it also includes the view that we have not the smallest right to assume the existence of 
transcendental objects or things in themselves, which would be either divine or morality incarnate. The 
view is the result of fully developed “truthfulness”: therefore a consequence of the belief in morality 
(WP1, p. 1, 2, 3). 
 
Nihilism gives a negative response to the question of “what purpose”. In other words, it is 
the belief that there is no meaning in this world. Both religion and science, according to Nietzsche, 
answer the question of what the purpose of life is in a negative way by explaining the meaning of 
life either as something beyond this world, or as creating scientific dogmas in the search for truth 
(WP, preface). He says: “Nihilism harbors in the heart of Christian morals” (WP, preface). 
Religion and the Christian God, he states, were once the reason d’etre and they led to nihilism. 
According to Christianity, he states, existence is regarded as punishment, and the duty of the 
individual is to regain the love of god in order to be able to have an eternal happy life. This causes 
resignation from the present world and thus causes a nihilistic attitude (WP, preface). As an 
alternative to religion, modern science also is a source of nihilism since it introduces an obsession 
with knowledge. For example, the sublime Greek culture is rooted in the instinctual, creative, 
affirmative and embracing metaphysical comfort of art. But modern science, by introducing 
rationality, reasoning and truth, sets the culture apart from this sublime artistic creation. In the 
"Attempt at Self-Criticism", the preface to the second edition of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
states that science gets rid of the fear and it helps to escape from pessimism by means of an 
optimistic promise to transcend an earlier, affirmative, tragic sense of life. By means of science, 
life becomes explainable, justifiable, rational, and we become capable not only of truly "knowing" 
life but of correcting it (BT, p. 96-7). This attitude is fundamentally opposed to a more irrational, 
instinctual, and artistic embrace of all aspects of existence embodied in Greek tragedy. Nietzsche 
 27
concludes in the Birth of Tragedy that science cannot explain life, that it will always fail in its 
attempts to do so.  
In The Gay Science Nietzsche remarks that science has achieved its status because of three 
errors: that it will reveal and help humanity understand God's goodness and wisdom, that the 
knowledge it generates has absolute utility, and that science is itself objective and innocent, a 
transparent tool (GS, par.105). But what is clear is that science and its will to truth have made it 
possible for these errors to become obvious. For at bottom science has a presupposition: truth is 
more necessary than anything else (GS, par. 13). This will to truth as above all else the will never 
to deceive is implicitly moral and metaphysical. Nietzsche points out that deception and simulation 
are integral to life. To posit truth as the highest good is also to affirm another realm that 
simultaneously and necessarily negates this one: truth has become divine, transcendent. Thus, 
science itself, while struggling against religion, creates another kind of metaphysics, “truth 
metaphysics”. 
The background to his critique of his age lies in the political structure of 19th century 
Europe. During the time Nietzsche wrote The Birth of Tragedy, nation states were fighting each 
other for power and a resentment among classes was developing in a divided Europe. The reason 
for the pessimism of early Nietzsche is that structure of European Culture. In the “Attempt at a Self 
Criticism” and the other prefaces he wrote at that time, Nietzsche describes his writings as the 
history of a sickness and convalescence.12 Later Nietzsche identifies his sickness with the political 
atmosphere of Europe and says that his convalescence was from this state of mind –namely the 
sickness of his age- through to a healthy free spirit13. The description of Nietzsche’s sickness and 
                                                 
12 Gordon Bearn, in Waking to Wonder: Wittgenstein’s Existential Investigations, analyzes these prefaces in 
depth calling them the “Seven Prefaces’. I will not focus on Nietzsche’s other prefaces except the preface 
“Attempt at a Self-Criticism” and his preface to Human All Too Human. 
13 Nietzsche defines the ideal human beings as ‘free spirits’ in Human All Too Human. 
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recovery appears in the first preface he wrote in 1886, the preface to the first volume of Human All 
Too Human, whose subtitle tells us it is “A Book for Free Spirits”. The anatomy of convalescence 
is presented as a geneology of the free spirit in four stages:hearth health, sickness, convalescence 
and the great health of free spirit (Bearn, p.4). He asks “Shall my experience –the history of an 
illness and recovery was what eventuated- have been my personal experience alone? And only my 
‘human all too human’?(HH II, par 6)” 
 In the preface to Human All Too Human, Nietzsche, referring to the first publication of the 
Birth of Tragedy, unravels the details of the sickness and convalescence. He sees his admiration of 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and Wagner’s music in The Birth of Tragedy as an incurable 
romanticism, and finds this attitude to be the source of his nihilistic and pessimistic approach to 
life in the Birth of Tragedy. These obsessions for Nietzsche are the outcomes of his attachment to 
truthfulness as the justification of life in the world. Truthfulness, as Christian faith once was, is 
another way of finding a ground for the meaning of the world. He describes this faith in 
truthfulness, and his great admiration of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and Wagner’s music as a 
period of sickness, since all these attitudes are a form of denial of the other forms of attitudes 
towards the meaning of life, such as finding meaning in the details of our everyday existence 
instead of looking for it in a metaphysical will, like Schopenhauer, or in music like Wagner. He 
states: 
Perhaps in this regard I might be reproached with having employed a certain amount of ‘art’, a certain 
amount of false-coinage: for example, that I knowingly-willfully closed my eyes before Schopenhauer’s 
blind will to morality at a time when I was already sufficiently clearsighted about morality; likewise 
that I deceived myself over Richard Wagner’s incurable romanticism, as though it were a beginning and 
not an end; likewise over the Greeks...Supposing, however all this were true and that I was reproached 
with it with good reason, what do you know, what could you know, of how much cunning in self-
preservation, how much reason and higher safeguarding, is contained in such self-deception —or how 
much falsity I shall require if I am to continue to permit myself the luxury of truthfullness...Enough, I 
am still living; and life is after all not a product of morality: it wants deception (HH, preface, p.6). 
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Thus he comes to see where his sickness lies in the Birth of Tragedy and starts to have a 
slow convalescence from a pessimistic sickness. He states that he invented free spirits who actually 
do not exist —since human beings are surrounded with sickness, solitude and unfamiliar places —
but will certainly one day exist. Europe will have these free spirits who will build a sublime culture 
(Human all Too Human, p.6). Convalescence from sickness through a free spirit is possible only 
with the great liberation by which the individual becomes the master of her own virtues. At the 
end of this convalescence individuals will become the free spirits that European society needs. 
Regarding this slow liberation Nietzsche writes: 
A step further in convalescence: and the free spirit again draws near to life –slowly, to be sure, almost 
reluctantly, almost mistrustfully. It again grows warmer around him, yellower, as it were; feeling and 
feeling for others acquire depth, warm breezes of all kind blow across him. It seems to him as if his eyes 
are only now open to what is close at hand. He is astonished and sits silent: where had he been? These 
close, closest things: how changed they seem! what bloom and magic they required! He looks back 
gratefully —grateful to his wandering, to his hardness and self-alienation, to his viewing of far distances 
and bird-like flights in cold heights. What a good thing he had not  always stayed ‘at home’, stayed 
‘under his own roof’ like a delicate apathetic loafer! He had been beside himself: no doubt of that. Only 
now does he see himself —and what surprises he experiences as he does so! What unprecedented 
shudders!(HH, par. 5) 
 
His age was mistaken since it tried to get out of this pessimism through science or reason; 
Nietzsche views these methods as another type of God creation. The way to overcome the nihilism 
of the age was seen either in the form of science or religion. However, for Nietzsche the problem 
of life can be overcome neither by scientific explanations nor by Christian dogmas. Nietzsche 
holds this view against scientism and religion both in his earlier and later thought. However, in his 
earlier thought he perceives art as the only way to get out of existential problems of life and creates 
an artistic form of deity. Later, he criticizes this dogmatic approach to the problem of life. 
In the following section I give the details of the change in Nietzsche’s conception of the 
meaning of life between the first publication of the Birth of Tragedy and the second publication of 
the same book with a preface called “Attempt at a Self Criticism”. I explain Nietzsche’s attitude 
towards life, the European society of his age, and Greek culture in the first publication of the Birth 
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of Tragedy. As mentioned, in his earlier thought he speaks with the voice of metaphysics while he 
is trying to give an answer to the question of the purpose of human existence or the meaning of 
life. His standpoint, strongly influenced by Schopenhauer, was  a metaphysical one.14 He argues 
that the true meaning of the world is beneath the surface, beyond the world we experience daily. 
He makes a valuation of reality with a world at a lower level, and thus the meaning of life cannot 
lie in it. The meaning of life is beyond the limits of this world, it lies in the artistic deity —the 
primordial unity of Dionysian and Apollonian artistic powers.. However in his later philosophy he 
denies such a metaphysical justification of the meaning of life and moves beyond metaphysics. The 
third section is on this movement beyond metaphysics. Later Nietzsche systematically criticizes his 
first edition of the Birth of Tragedy and I base my argument on this criticism. 
(iii) Early Nietzsche 
In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s main focus is “the big question mark concerning the value of 
existence”(SC, par1).He criticizes European society for being pessimistic by remaining under the 
influence of Christianity. Nietzsche examines the dynamics of Greek culture which, according to 
him, lead to a profound artistic development. He views the Pre-Socratic Greek society as the ideal 
society, and explains the reasons for its excellence. He sets up Greek society as an example to 
Europeans, and as a philosopher, by showing the main forces that build up the sublime Greek 
culture, he aims to fulfill the task of enlightening his society. 
 According to Nietzsche, the main artistic product of Greek society was  tragedy. Artistic 
development in Greek society was due to the relationship between two different attitudes arising 
from two Greek Gods, namely Apollo and Dionysus. He states: 
                                                 
14 Nietzsche was highly influenced by Schopenhauer in his earlier period, in fact his shift in his second term can 
be explained as a shift from a Schopenhauerian point of view. Wittgenstein was highly influenced by 
Schopenhauer’s thought in his earlier period too. The change in both Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions 
of the meaning of life can be explained in terms of their turn from Schopenhauer. Although this is a very strong 
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We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics, once we perceive not merely by logical 
inference, but with the immediate certainty of vision, that the continuous development of art is bound 
up with the Apollonian and Dionysian duality- just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, 
involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations (BT, par1).15
 
Apollo and Dionysus in Greek culture were the two artistic deities, through the influence of 
which, according to Nietzsche, Greeks created an inspiring culture. Apollo was the god of 
sculpture and Dionysius was the god of music. Apollo, in the first publication of the Birth of 
Tragedy, stands for order, measure, form, clarity, and individuality of an artistic creation as well as 
uniqueness and singularity. Nietzsche thinks epic poetry and plastic arts like painting and sculpture 
are mainly the products of the Apollonian artistic attitude in Greek society. The three main aspects 
of Apollonian artistic creation are captured by the concepts of restraint, of balance and of 
limitation. These are the qualities that require the contribution of human reflection and rationality 
to the proper creation of the art work. Thus, in his Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche identified the 
Apollonian attitude of Greek culture with individuality, limitation, as well as visual and dreamlike 
experience (BT, p.67-106). 
For Nietzsche, the dream world is a necessity to all artistic productions; he states that 
dreams are the prerequisite of all plastic art, and poetry (BT, p.34). In the dreams of an artist there 
is an immediate understanding of figures and forms, and there is nothing unimportant or 
superfluous. All dream experience is immediate and thus feels real. Nietzsche argues that in spite 
of this immediate experience of the figures as if they are real, the dreamer senses them as a mere 
appearance (BT, p.34). The dream world, for Nietzsche is the illusion that is necessary for artistic 
production. Nietzsche identifies this dream world with Apollo. He is the “shining one”16and is the 
                                                                                                                                                
argument in supporting my thesis, I will not focus on the details of the discussion of Schopenhauer’s influence in 
their respective thoughts. 
15 Here Nietzsche implicitly criticizes the scientific approach to the problem of life, and sees the spontaneity of 
Greek art as the true way of getting out of pessimism. Art, unlike science does not make logical inferences, but it 
provides a better explanation of the problem of life. 
16 The ‘shining one’is the Etymology of the word ‘Apollo’. 
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ruler over the beautiful illusion of the inner world of fantasy (BT, p.35). Nietzsche calls Apollo the 
“soothsaying faculty” since Apollo represents the healing power of dreams and sleep, and the 
beauty of arts in general. The source of the beauty of all arts is Apollo, which makes life possible 
and worth living (p.35). Nietzsche applies to Apollo the words of Schopenhauer when he spoke of 
the man wrapped in the maya.17
Just as in a stormy sea that, unbounded in all directions, raises and drops mountainous waves, howling, a 
sailor sits in a boat and trusts in his frail bark: so in the midst of a world of torments the individual being 
sits quietly, supported by and trusting in the principium individuationis (Schopenhauer, World as Will and 
Representation I ,p.416). 
 
Apollo stands for individuality in Nietzsche’s interpretation, and he is the divine and 
sublime image of the principium individuationis18, and is the wisdom of illusion and beauty. He is 
the individual who resists the tremendous terror of Dionysian ecstasy. Apollo, god of all plastic 
energies, according to Nietzsche, is at the same time the god of words and language. Words, in 
Nietzsche’s understanding, correspond to dreamlike experiences, through which we can see reality, 
but which is not reality itself. Words reveal to us the apparent world; they make us face illusion, 
not the reality beyond that illusion. Thus, according to Nietzsche’s conception, language is capable 
of expressing the illusory meaning of the world but it is not sufficient to express the real meaning 
that is beyond the limits of this world. 19
In the first publication of the Birth of Tragedy, Dionysus stands for the instinctual elements 
in human expression such as violent drives of intense emotion, sensuality, intoxication, and 
                                                 
17 “Illusion” in Sanskrit 
18 ‘Principle of individuation’ symbolizes the individual's separation from the chaos of life when she is under the 
protective influence of Apollo. Apollo supports the unshaken faith in this principle of the individual. Nietzsche 
contrasts this with the Dionysian immersion in the world will, in order to show how opposite those two art-deities 
really are. According to the principle of individuation there are boundaries that separate the individual from the 
world and from each other. These boundaries are necessary in order to ensure the healthy functioning of society. 
When these boundaries begin to break down, we can be sure that Dionysus is near.  
19 In this context, Nietzsche’s earlier understanding of language, as not being capable of expressing the true 
meaning of the world resembles Wittgenstein’s earlier conception of language. Wittgenstein makes a valuation 
between the higher and the lower levels of reality and language takes place at the lower, thus it cannot explain 
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sometimes frenzy and madness.20 Nietzsche associates the Dionysian attitude towards art with lyric 
and dithyrambic poetry and also with music and drama performed at public spectacles both of 
which often required the active participation of the audience. Dionysus stands for the unity, 
wholeness, and indivisibility of Greek culture according to Nietzsche. Dionysus, in the Birth of 
Tragedy, refers to the explosive powers of Greek society, the luxuriance of vegetation, the harvest 
of drunkenness, and an awesome, joyful, and occasionally fear-inspiring experience of energy and 
eroticism, which transgresses the general rules, norms, and codes of both individual and social 
existence.  
The Dionysian aspect of Greek culture is the opposite of the Apollonian aspect. Unlike 
Apollo, in Nietzsche’s perspective, Dionysus was inspiring collective displays of ecstatic 
celebration, wherein the individual loses possession of himself and becomes a part of a larger 
whole through music, wine, recitation, and orgiastic displays of mystical and sexual frenzy. The 
principle of principium individuationis that Nietzsche identifies with the Apollonian attitude is no 
longer valid for the Dionysian attitude; rather the individual is in the world, as a part of it in 
Dionysian ecstasy. The Apollonian vision stands as a dream world to waking life, whereas the 
Dionysian attitude appears as the most extreme intensification of life. Nietzsche explains Dionysus 
by analogy with intoxication, within which there is no longer any concern with individual goals 
and specific aims. Apollo represents the individual who desires to exist by means of a dream vision 
of beauty, order, and measure. The Apollonian attitude of Greek society is the individual’s means 
of reflecting her beauty, her balance, and her creativity. On the contrary, the Dionysian state does 
                                                                                                                                                
what is higher —the meaning of life. Even though it is not as explicit, Nietzsche, by limiting language just to the 
expression of illusion puts Apollonian language at a lower level than the realm where the meaning lies. 
20 Nietzsche’s conception of the Dionysian in the first publication of the Birth of Tragedy differs from his later 
conception of the Dionysian including in his “Attempt at a Self-Criticism”. He originally introduces the term 
‘Dionysian’ to symbolize the general attitude in the Dionysian festivals in Greek culture which are full of ecstasy, 
frenzy and orgiastic tendencies and contrasts it with the Apollonian attitude. In his later thought the Dionysian 
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not consider the individual as distinct from the society. The Dionysian attitude is a whole, 
undivided, unindividuated attitude. The world is one and a whole, and independent of any singular 
or distinctive creation. In the Dionysian state of intense excitement and ecstasy, an individual is 
dispossessed of her individuality, her character, personality, tastes, fears, reflections, and values. 
By contrast, the Apollonian tendency consists in the specific ordering, selection, and elevation of 
certain dispositions, with the idealization of particular values and judgments. The Apollonian 
inclination unifies these selected elements of individuals and casts them forth as exemplary images 
for the purpose of defining and preserving the individual as unique, whereas the Dionysian attitude 
consists in the effective removal of these individuating features. Ultimately, if the Apollonian 
dream state corresponds to the idealized elements of an individual which both constitutes the 
individual as an individual and preserves her as such within a society, then the Dionysian state 
corresponds to a disintegration of these elements, a suspension of individual and socially 
sanctioned codes. With the Dionysian state of intoxication we witness the loss of personal identity 
(Ackermann, 1990, p.23-52).  
According to Nietzsche, the magnificence of classical Greek culture was due to the 
recognition and acceptance of both attitudes. They are necessary for the highest state of Classical 
Greek art and tragic drama. Classical tragedy achieved a balance of the Dionysian and Apollonian 
attitudes that mirrors the complexities of human existence. There is a unity formed with individual 
action and social performance in Greek tragedy. Nietzsche calls this collaboration of two 
contrasting attitudes primordial unity (Ur-Eine). This primordial unity is brought about through the 
Dionysian power but it still reveals the Apollonian beauty of the art work. For Nietzsche under the 
Dionysian attitude the union between the separate individuals in society is reaffirmed. At the same 
                                                                                                                                                
stands for the creative employment of passions and the affirmation of life in spite of suffering. He contrasted the 
Dionysian with the Christian negation of life and extirpation of the passions (Kaufmann, 1963, p.20 n.). 
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time, nature, which had become hostile and alienated, celebrated her reunion with her lost son, by 
whom Nietzsche means human society and culture (BT, p.37). 
In distinguishing the Apollonian attitude from the Dionysian attitude, Nietzsche makes a 
valuation of the levels of reality. Apollo stands for the illusory world, in other words, the world we 
encounter everyday. The world we experience everyday does not provide the meaning that we are 
looking for. The Apollonian world lies at the lower level, the meaning of life is at the higher level; 
this world, as it is, does not include any values. Dionysus stands for the unindividuated wholeness 
of the world. As mentioned before Dionysus combines the Dionysian ecstasy and the Apollonian 
illusion in the form of primordial unity. The Dionysian in this context is at a higher level than the 
Apollonian. However, primordial unity, as the primary condition of art, is the highest level of 
reality and that is where the meaning of life lies. So there are three levels of reality in terms of their 
value: the Apollonian at the lowest, the Dionysian at the middle and the Primordial unity at the 
highest level. Apollo, the God of illusion and dreams is the source of artistic beauty and the 
characteristic style of the individual artist. The measure, order and design of the art work are due to 
Apollo’s existence. These properties of the Apollonian attitude are the properties that are related to 
the appearance of the art work.  
In Greek tragedy, for example, Apollo corresponds to the individual actors’ performance on 
the stage — their voice, the words they say and the costumes they wear. However the other crucial 
component of Greek tragedy is the chorus, which reveals the unity and single voice of the 
performance and thus is the Dionysian component of tragedy according to Nietzsche. It is the 
unification of the Apollonian and Dionysian aspects of society that lead to the sublime 
cheerfulness of Greek art and Greek culture. There is a tension between these two opposite gods 
and this continuous tension shows itself in Greek art. Nietzsche saw Greek art as the truly 
metaphysical activity of the union between the Dionysian and Apollonian attitudes. This 
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metaphysical activity gives us a metaphysical comfort; in this metaphysical comfort we can attain 
the meaning of life. The primordial unity, Nietzsche argues, is the metaphysical comfort of sublime 
Greek culture. Tragedy is the production of this unity: 
The metaphysical comfort —with which, I am suggesting even now, every true tragedy leaves us— that 
life is at the bottom of things, despite all the changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and 
pleasurable, this comfort appears in incarnate clarity in the chorus of satyrs, a chorus of natural beings 
who live ineradicably, as it were, behind all civilization and remain eternally the same, despite the 
changes of generations and of the history of nations (BT., p.59). 
 
The everyday life and world are parts of the world of appearances according to Nietzsche, 
and this is Apollonian reality. Dionysian reality is identified with the world beyond the individual 
that makes the individual disappear. No matter what happens in the apparent world, reality is 
beyond that and stays the same through time. The Dionysian encompasses the Apollonian and 
constitutes the highest level of reality: the primordial unity. It is the unique ground of life which 
gives a meaning to human existence. The things in the apparent world are transitory, temporary 
and superficial whereas in the real world everything is profound, meaningful and the individual is 
united with the sublime totality. Nietzsche suggests that the Dionysian state is more natural. This 
can be understood only in the sense that nature as a whole is more comprehensive than the 
individuating and possessive dream image would have us believe. But only the Dionysian, without 
the apparent beauty of the Apollonian is not sufficient to construct the sublime Greek art. The 
Dionysian state of intoxication is more primal than the Apollonian vision, since it is essentially 
polymorphous, undirected and nonspecific. It has to do with that undiminished state of existence 
upon which forms are enacted, codes imposed, and specific goals written. The opposition between 
the Apollonian and Dionysian forces forms a primordial unity in the form of art —tragedy in 
Greek culture— which is the metaphysical comfort that individuals are seeking. The individual, 
who was living in an illusory world before, now loses herself in the whole unity of the Dionysian 
reality and finds an answer to the big question concerning human existence. The answer is the 
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ground that human life is standing on, the world of reality. The task of the individual is to go 
beyond the apparent world and lose herself in the unity of nature. The answer for Nietzsche was, as 
happened in Greek culture, to become a part of the whole Dionysian reality and lose all the 
individualistic dreamlike illusions of everyday life.  Regarding metaphysical comfort, Nietzsche 
states: 
The contrast between the real truth of nature and the lie of culture that poses as if it were the only reality 
is similar to that between the eternal core of things, the thing-in-itself, and the whole world of 
appearances: just as tragedy, with its metaphysical comfort points to the eternal life of this core of 
existence which abides through the perpetual destruction of appearances, the symbolism of the satyr 
chorus proclaims this primordial relationship between the thing-in-itself and appearance (BT, p 62).21
 
Dionysus, in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy is perceived as the primary god of art, in 
other words he is seen as the art deifier. Although it is the tension between Apollonian and 
Dionysian attitudes that produces the primordial unity, metaphysical comfort solely lies on 
Dionysian unity and intoxication. Art, in this sense, is seen as the true metaphysical activity of 
human beings. The individual artist, through Dionysian ecstasy, gets released from her individual 
will and becomes the medium through which the one truly existent subject celebrates its existence. 
This truly existent subject is the Dionysian artist who was released from her individuality and 
discreteness. Art becomes the expression of the Dionysian metaphysical comfort where all the 
individuals are intoxicated from their individualities. Thus, the world is justified as an aesthetic 
phenomenon. The meaning of life is reduced to artistic meaning. Behind all events, under the veil 
of maya, there is an artistic meaning lying in the form of a Dionysian God. Nietzsche, by defining 
the meaning of life as an artistic phenomenon makes a metaphysical interpretation of the meaning 
of life in the sense that the meaning lies beyond the limits of this world, in the bosom of the 
primordial unity. 
                                                 
21 Here, Nietzsche is highly influenced [through Schopenhauer] by Kant’s distinction between the thing-in-itself. 
and appearance. 
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According to Nietzsche sculpture, painting and poetry are the artifacts of the Apollonian 
attitude, whereas music was that of the Dionysian. Poetry, painting and sculpture are dependent on 
the rational and intellectual attitude of the artist. Order, measure, and light —namely the 
Apollonian properties— gain priority in the creation of these forms of art. The individual artist is at 
the centre, creating these art forms, whereas, in music the individual notes lose their meaning in the 
continuation of the music just as one loses one’s individuality in the Dionysian festivals through 
intoxication. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche defines music as continuous, whole, primordial 
and sublime. In Greek tragedy, the two forms of artistic deities are present: The chorus and the 
individual performers. Greek tragedy is a union of the two artistic deities and thus is the sublime 
art for Nietzsche.  He states: 
In song and in dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community; he has forgotten how 
to walk and speak and is on the way toward flying into the air, dancing....He is no longer an artist, he 
has become a work of art: in these paroxysms of intoxication the artistic power of all nature reveals 
itself to the highest gratification of the primordial unity (BT, p.37). 
Music is Dionysian, and language is Apollonian; thus language takes place at a lower level 
than music.22 The primordial unity finds its ultimate expression in music; language is only a tool to 
depict this true world to our ears. Nietzsche states: 
First of all, however we must conceive the folk song as the musical mirror of the world, as the original 
melody, now seeking for itself a parallel dream phenomenon and expressing it in poetry. Melody is 
therefore primary and universal, and so may admit of several objectifications in several texts...Melody 
generates the poem out of itself, ever again: that is what the strophic form of the folk song signifies. (BT, 
p.53) 
 
As seen, the musical is the true nature of the world and language is only there to imitate 
music (BT, p.53), in other words imitate the true world and depict it to us in the form of poetry or a 
song with lyrics. The relationship between the word and music, according to Nietzsche, is “....the 
only possible relation between poetry and music, between word and tone: the word, the image, the 
                                                 
22 Language is lower than the mystical —the essence of reality— according to the Tractatus as well. More in the 
second chapter. 
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concept here seeks an expression analogous to music and now feels in itself the power of music 
(BT, p.54)”. 
A question arises at this point; how can poetry imitate music in its images and concepts?  
How can the structure and the expressions of language reveal the musical melody? Nietzsche 
answers this question from a Schopenhauerian point of view: 
If therefore, we may regard lyric poetry as the imitative fulguration of music in images and concepts, 
we should now ask: “As what does music appear in the mirror of images and concepts?” It appears as 
will, taking the term in Schopenhauer’s sense, i.e. as the opposite of the aesthetic, purely contemplative 
and passive frame of mind (BT, p.55). 
 
The passion and motivation of the artist poet is Dionysian or musical and it is the basic 
inspiration for her to express herself through the mediacy of the words. With her Apollonian 
intellect, the artist conceives of all nature and of herself as a part of it. She regards herself, as a part 
of nature, as willing, desiring, creating and longing for unity. Her Apollonian contemplation is not 
satisfied with words, though she keeps trying to express herself through words. This is the musical 
inspiration of the poet; it is the background of all her artistic creation. (BT, p.55) 
The distinction between language and music is very important in Nietzsche’s early period. 
He regards music as the sublime and divine form of art and argues that language can never reflect 
the music: 
Our whole discussion insists that lyric poetry is dependent on the spirit of music just as music itself in its 
absolute sovereignty does not need the image and the concept, but merely endures them as 
accompaniments. The poems of the lyricist can express nothing that did not already lie hidden in that vast 
universality and absoluteness in the music that compelled him to figurative speech. Language can never 
adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, because music stands in symbolic relation to the 
primordial contradiction and primordial pain in the heart of the primordial unity, and therefore symbolizes 
a sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena. Rather all phenomena, compared with it, are merely 
symbols: hence language, as the organ and symbol of phenomena, can never by any means disclose the 
innermost heart of music; language, in its attempt to imitate it, can only be in superficial contact with 
music; while all the eloquence of lyric poetry cannot bring the deepest significance of the latter one step 
nearer to us (BT, p.55-56). 
 
According to Nietzsche, Greek culture collapses after the introduction of science and 
rationality into art and culture, which he regards as having started with Socrates. Nietzsche 
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interprets the obsessive rationality of the Europeans that started with Socrates as the reason for the 
failure of contemporary European society. For him, tragedy died because of “the Socratism of 
morality, the dialectics, frugality, and cheerfulness of the theoretical man —how now? Might not 
this very Socratism be a sign of decline, of weariness, of infection, of the anarchical dissolution of 
the instincts?”(SC, p.18) 
According to Nietzsche, scientism, which starts with Socrates, is a kind of response to 
pessimism; i.e, the negative attitude towards life in the idea that everything in society can only get 
worse (SC, p.18). European culture tries to run away from the pessimistic stage of the age through 
explaining everything scientifically, but for Nietzsche the right way to get out of such a nihilistic 
and pessimistic state is art: 
And science itself, our science —indeed, what is the significance of all science, viewed as a symptom of 
life? For what —worse yet, whence—all science? How now? Is the resolve to be so scientific about 
everything perhaps a kind of fear of, an escape from, pessimism? A subtle last resort against —truth. And, 
morally speaking, a sort of cowardice and falseness? Amorally speaking, a ruse? O Socrates, Socrates, was 
that perhaps your secret? O enigmatic ironist, was that perhaps your —irony (SC., p.19) 
 
The true meaning of life is art, which can be found in the Primordial Unity. Primordial 
unity is metaphysical; it is grounded on an artistic deity and it is not within the limits of this world. 
It lies at a higher level; it is what holds the world together. The sublimity of Greek culture is due to 
the scaffolding of the Primordial Unity.  The task of the individual, in order to find meaning, is to 
go beyond the limits of this world and find the metaphysical comfort of the Ur-Eine. It is of great 
value. On Nietzsche’s view, contemporary European culture is falling apart due to the lack of an 
interest in the primordial unity. European culture can get out of its nihilistic stage by going back to 
the roots of Greek art and culture. In other words, European society has to remember what was 
once of great value before a Christian God and science came.  
The explanation of the grounds for the sublime Greek culture —primordial unity— gives a 
certainty to the individual who is trying to find the meaning of life. The individual, now, at least 
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knows what she should do in order to attain meaning — create artistic work with the unity of 
Apollonian and Dionysian powers. In early Nietzsche’s view meaning can be found by containing 
both Apollonian and Dionysian powers in oneself, and expressing this in the form of art. This is a 
metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life; since the meaning lies somewhere beyond the 
limits of the world, the individual knows that a certain kind of meaning exists and there is a certain 
way to get there. 
(iv) Later Nietzsche 
Now, I would like to discuss the change in Nietzsche’s ideas in the later period of his thought. In 
the preface to the 1886 edition of the Birth of Tragedy, namely “Attempt at a Self-Criticism”, and 
in his Human All Too Human he criticizes his earlier thoughts and explains what kind of mistakes 
he made in his earlier period. 
In the “Attempt at a Self-Criticism”, he explains the sociopolitical circumstances of his age 
and the psychological state he was in during that time. He states that he wrote the Birth of Tragedy 
during the time of the Franco-Prussian war. He unfolds the circumstances of the war and the 
stressful atmosphere the society was in. He defines himself as an author trying to find the roots of 
the “alleged” Greek cheerfulness in order to provide a constructive solution to the depressive state 
of his society during the war. He identifies his psychological mood with the ups and downs of the 
war. At the end of the war, when the peace treaty is signed between the parties, he states, he also 
attained peace with himself and slowly convalesced “from an illness contracted at the front” (SC, 
p.17). Then he completed the final draft of the Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music with a 
critique of the earlier version. 
He now sees the Birth of Tragedy as a pessimistic book regarding its approach to “the big 
question mark concerning the value of existence”. He finds it an “impossible book” that resulted 
from a “task so uncongenial to youth”  (SC, p.18). First of all, he criticizes the style of the book 
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and finds it very complicated, inconsistent and not easy to read. Regarding the style, and the 
content of the Birth of Tragedy, he says: 
I consider it badly written, ponderous, embarrassing, image-mad and image confused, sentimental, in 
places saccharine to the point of effeminacy, uneven in tempo, without the will to logical cleanliness, 
very convinced and therefore disdainful of proof, mistrustful even of the propriety of proof, a book for 
initiates, ‘music’ for those dedicated to music, those who are closely related to begin with on the basis 
of common and rare aesthetic experiences, “music” meant as a sign of recognition for close relatives in 
artibus —an arrogant and rhapsodic book that sought to exclude right from the beginning the profanum 
vulgus of “the educated” even more than “the mass” or “the folk” (SC, p.19). 
 
He believes that the task of the book was to enlighten Europeans about the collapse of their 
culture and to motivate them to go back to the origin of Greek culture and implement the Greek 
attitude to modern society to attain a higher culture. Although the book tries to present the diverse 
structure of Greek society and complains about the monopoly of science in contemporary culture, 
with that complicated and uneven style, the author —Nietzsche himself— dictates what is true and 
what is not true.   Thus, hypocritically, the style of the book does not even let people understand 
what the real intention of the author is and develop the ideas he is trying to put forward. In The 
Birth of Tragedy he accuses science of being too assertive and dogmatic and of having a monopoly 
power over culture. However Nietzsche now admits that he himself used the same kind of 
language with respect to art in the Birth of Tragedy. He criticizes the Birth of Tragedy for being 
full of aesthetic images that can only be understood by artists, especially musicians. Although the 
book is written for the whole society, his style gives the impression that only artists can understand 
the book and further it dictates that only artists can save European society:  
Constructed from a lot of immature, overgreen personal experiences, all of them close to the limits of 
communication, presented in the context of art —for the problem of science cannot be recognized in the 
context of science— a book perhaps for artists who also have an analytic and retrospective penchant (in 
other words, an exceptional type of artist for whom one might have to look far and wide and really 
would not care to look); a book full of psychological innovations and artists’ secrets, with an artists’ 
metaphysics in the background; a youthful work full of the intrepid mood of youth, the moodiness of 
youth, independent, defiantly self-reliant even where it seems to bow before an authority and personal 
reverence; in sum, a first book, also in every bad sense of that label (SC, p.18). 
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He admits that he created a metaphysics of art while he was attacking the metaphysics of 
religion and even science. He comes to a point where he denies all kinds of metaphysics even if it 
is the metaphysics of art. The strong belief in the primordial unity of Apollonian and Dionysian 
attitudes, the main component of art, providing a metaphysical comfort for society, is no longer 
accepted. Human beings do not need a unique ground to lean on to make their life worth living 
such as the metaphysical comfort —primordial unity— that Greek culture leans on. Instead of 
seeking metaphysical comfort, which can be in the form of a strong faith in religion, or strong faith 
in science, Nietzsche calls on society to wake up to see the reality of this world — the only world 
to live in. His metaphysical approach to the world, which revealed itself as an identification of the 
Apollonian with the apparent world and the Dionysian with the real world, is no longer acceptable 
to the later Nietzsche. 
He no longer accepts a distinction between the higher level of reality —primordial unity— 
and the lower level of reality —Apollonian world—; rather he sees this distinction as a problem 
arising from the philosopher’s failure to create his own language. He states that he did not find his 
own vocabulary and used the terms that were used by both Schopenhauer or Kant, referring to the 
distinction between the phenomena and noumena: 
How I regret now that in those days I still lacked the courage (or immodesty) to permit myself in every 
way an individual language of my own for such individual views and hazards –and that instead I tried 
laboriously to express by means of Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulas strange and new valuations 
which were basically at odds with Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s spirit and taste (SC, p.24). 
 
In addition to his critique of his use of Schopenhauerian and Kantian explanations of the 
world with a distinction between the real and the apparent, he criticizes Schopenhauer’s 
pessimistic approach and states that he was far removed from what Schopenhauer thinks: 
…What after all, did Schopenhauer think of tragedy? “That which bestows on everything tragic its 
peculiar elevating force” –he says in The World as Will and Representation”, volume II, p.495 –“is the 
discovery that the world, that life, can never give real satisfaction and hence is not worthy of our 
affection: this constitutes the tragic spirit –it leads to resignation.” How differently Dionysus spoke to 
me? How far I was removed from resignationism! (SC p.24) 
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He now considers his positioning of the meaning of life at the heart of the primordial unity 
as resignationism and as pessimism. His conception of primordial unity as the meaning of life  
signifies that people cannot find the meaning of life in this world, and further they are hopeless 
about their future that they do not even expect good things. By thinking that there is a higher level 
of reality which contains the meaning of life and is just and full of promises of happiness, they 
avoid the reality of the now and hold their hopes for that other world. Thus people’s lives become a 
kind of burden on themselves where they do not create anything new or develop a sublime culture.  
Nietzsche also makes a profound criticism regarding the message the book is trying to give. 
Nietzsche during his life time retained some of the ideas from the first publication of the Birth of 
Tragedy and never changed his mind regarding the message the book tries to give, however he 
totally changed his mind about the means to fulfill the task of enlightening European society to 
produce a higher culture. He redefined the means to free European culture from its pre- established 
values. 
As mentioned before, the Europeans, as Nietzsche interprets them, wanted a Christian God 
who will supply another world, the true world for them. The question concerning the value of 
human existence —what is the meaning of life, what is the purpose of human existence— was 
solved by a God according to Christianity. In the Birth of Tragedy he explains how wrong this 
need for Christian faith is. Such faith is one of the reasons for the decline of Greek culture as well 
and is also responsible for the pessimistic atmosphere of his age. Pessimism in Nietzsche’s 
conception refers to the acceptance of the world as meaningless, purposeless and hopeless since no 
one is able to change anything. It is the belief that everything will keep getting worse in this world 
but in the next life the Christian God will give human kind what they actually deserve. In a 
religious faith, there is something to look forward to, there is something to expect even though it is 
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in another world; it is the real world and individuals look forward to the day when they will start 
living in the real world. So the meaning of the world lies beyond this world, in the other world. 
Nietzsche was against this approach and found it a form of resignation, pessimism and decline, and 
introduced Apollonian and Dionysian features of Greek society to explain why they had a higher 
culture and what contemporary Europeans should do to attain that level. To hold hopes for another 
world, to expect something from God —not from one’s own self— is a sign of resignation and 
pessimism; it shows that a person is not responsible for her life anymore since she does not try to 
create a meaning by herself. 
Nietzsche, in his later period, keeps defending this thesis. However, in the “Attempt at a 
Self-Criticism” he criticizes his earlier account of Greek culture because he had approached 
Dionysus as the Christians approach God. He criticizes himself for creating another form of God, 
this time an amoral and artistic God. He defined Dionysus as an art-deifier. He states in SC: 
Already in the preface addressed to Richard Wagner, art, and not morality, is presented as the truly 
metaphysical activity of man. In the book itself the suggestive sentence is repeated several times, that 
the existence of the world is justified only as an artistic phenomenon. Indeed, the whole book knows 
only an artistic meaning and crypto-meaning behind all events –a “god”. If you please but certainly only 
an entirely reckless and amoral artist-god who wants to experience, whether he is building or 
destroying, in the good and in the bad, his own joy and glory –one who, creating worlds, frees himself 
from the distress of fullness and overfullness and from the affliction of the contradictions compressed in 
his soul. The world –at every moment the attained salvation of God, as the eternally changing, eternally 
new vision of the most deeply afflicted, discordant and contradictory being who can find salvation only 
in appearance; you can call this whole artist’s metaphysical, arbitrary, idle, fantastic; what matters is 
that it betrays a spirit who will one day fight at any risk whatever the moral interpretation and 
significance of existence (SC, p.22). 
 
He finds it intolerably wrong to seek the meaning of life beyond this world; thus he argues 
against the metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life. In Christianity it was the other world 
or a moral god that was giving the world its meaning. This time, in early Nietzsche’s case, it is the 
Dionysian art and music that created the meaning. Art, especially music was considered as 
sublime. Even though the god in the Birth of Tragedy was an immoral and artistic god, it cannot 
eliminate the fact that there is a metaphysical attitude in that approach. Art was still considered as 
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sublime and beyond this world just like the Christian god. Nietzsche considers his earlier 
explanation of Dionysian Apollonian unity –primordial unity in other words- an explanation of an 
artists’ metaphysics.  
As I stated in the first section, Nietzsche identified the Dionysian attitude in Greek culture 
with music. Likewise, Wagner was the epitome of German music through whom the Europeans 
would reach enlightenment. Nietzsche, earlier in the first publication of The Birth of Tragedy, 
stated that music reveals the metaphysical essence of the world. Language or words which are 
identified with the Apollonian attitude are not sufficient to do that. A metaphysical world cannot 
be expressed through language; we can only understand it through music. Even though music still 
cannot reveal the essence of the metaphysical world, it still allows us access to the essence of life 
through intoxication and ecstasy. Now, later Nietzsche criticizes this approach, finding it as a one 
sided explanation of life, which perceives Dionysus as a ‘still unknown God’: 
What found expression here was anyway —this was admitted with as much curiosity as antipathy— a 
strange voice, the disciple of a still “unknown God”, one who concealed himself for the time being under 
the scholar’s hood, under the gravity and dialectical ill humor of the German, even under bad manners of 
the Wagnerian. Here was a spirit with strange, still nameless needs, a memory bursting with questions, 
experiences, concealed things after which the name of Dionysus was added as one more question mark. 
What spoke here —as was admitted, not without suspicion— was something like a mystical, almost 
monadic soul that stammered with difficulty, a feat of the will, as in a strange tongue, almost undecided 
whether it should communicate or conceal itself. It should have sung –and not spoken  (SC, p.19-20). 
 
He criticizes himself for simply replacing one metaphysical thought  —the Christian God 
and Christian morality that he found as the reason for the collapse of the European culture —with 
another metaphysical thought — the perception of the Greek god Dionysus as another god and art 
as a faith. Just as morality was reflected as the essence of the Christian society, Dionysian culture 
is presented as the morality of the Greek culture. Nietzsche claims that he was opposed to Christian 
morality because of this dogma but he himself replaced it with the same thing in his Birth of 
Tragedy. He found his admiration for primordial unity as a metaphysical comfort totally false and 
unreasonable. Music is not the only way of communicating with the real world; the real world is 
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right here and it can be communicated through different points of views or language games in 
Wittgenstein’s sense.   
 His approach to the Dionysian attitude as a reality behind the maya is abolished. He 
abandons his metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life. Instead he starts to appreciate the 
actuality of the world – the Now. Meaning does not lie in the metaphysical comfort of either 
religion, or science, or art. The meaning of life is within the limits of this world, in the actuality of 
the day. The individual has to create the meaning as she goes along; but pursuing one kind of 
dogmatic approach is not the right way to find meaning. This is what Nietzsche is criticizing: the 
dogmatic approach to meaning.  He thus stated in the last section of “An Attempt at a Self-
Criticism”: 
But my dear sir, what in the world is romantic if your book isn’t? Can deep hatred against “the Now,” 
against “reality” and “modern ideas” be pushed further than you pushed it in your artists’ metaphysics? 
Believing sooner in the Nothing, sooner in the devil than in “the Now”? Is it not a deep bass of wrath and 
the lust for destruction that we hear humming underneath all of your contrapuntal vocal art and seduction 
of the ear, a furious resolve against everything that is “now”, a will that is not too far removed from 
practical nihilism and seems to say: “sooner let nothing be true than you should be right, than that your 
truth should be proved right!” (SC, p.25) 
 
So he suggests staying in the now rather than relying on a reality behind a veil. Human 
beings should get rid of their search for metaphysical comfort and rely on the now. Dionysus is no 
longer an art deifier. Nietzsche does not regard the metaphysical comfort of the union of Dionysian 
and Apollonian attitudes as the grounding of life. Instead he presents a new solution to the problem 
of the meaning of life: 
…would it not be necessary for the tragic man of such a culture, in view of his self-education for 
seriousness and terror to desire a new art, the art of metaphysical comfort, to desire tragedy as his own 
proper Helen, and to exclaim with Faust: 
Should not my longing overlap the distance? 
And draw the fairest form into existence? 
“Would it not be necessary? –No, thrice no! O you young romantics: it would not be necessary! But it is 
highly probable that it will end that way, that you end that way- namely “comforted,” as it is written, in 
spite of all self-education for seriousness and terror “comforted metaphysically “-in sum, as romantics 
end, as Christians. 
No! You ought to learn the art of this-worldly comfort first; you ought to learn to laugh, my young 
friends, if you are hell-bent on remaining pessimists. Then perhaps, as laughers, you may some day 
dispatch all metaphysical comforts to the devil –metaphysics in front (SC, p.26). 
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Laughing is a basic existential act; laughing requires seeing what is going on in this world 
and responding. Instead of searching for meaning in an abstract place and in an abstract way one 
should see this world and laugh at it. In the Gay Science Nietzsche says: 
Finally, one comes back out of such abysses, out of such severe sickness, and out of the sickness of 
strong suspicion —new-born, with the skin cast; more sensitive, more wicked, with a finer taste for joy, 
with a more delicate tongue for all good things, with a merrier disposition, with a second and more 
innocence in joy; more childish at the same time, and a hundred times more refined than ever before 
(GS, par.8) 
 
He comprehends the metaphysical approach to meaning as sickness and isolation from the 
closest values. The reason for metaphysics is the viewpoint that this life offers nothing to hold on 
to thus we should seek for an alternative ground. He denies this metaphysical approach. The 
meaning of life, in his anti-metaphysical interpretation is not beyond the limits of this world, but it 
lies within it. It is everyday life, with its good or bad aspects, that contains the meaning. The 
individual, free from any dogmatic approach to God, religion, science or art, should create 
meaning for herself within the limits of the world. We have to learn this worldly comfort first 
instead of trying to create metaphysical comfort in the form of dogmatic obsession. The way to 
overcome the nihilistic and pessimistic struggle of everyday life is not to try to get away from this 
world, and walk in some romantic other-worldly dreams, but to accept life and the world as they 
are and try to establish a meaning of one’s own.  Instead of looking for meaning at a higher place 
we should now see what is closest.  
....Oh those Greeks! They knew how to live: for that purpose it is necessary to keep bravely to the service, 
the fold and the skin; to worship appearance, to believe in forms, tones, and words, in the whole Olympus 
of appearance! These Greeks were superficial —from profundity! And are we not coming back precisely 
to this point, we dare-devils of the spirit, who have scaled the highest and most dangerous peak of 
contemporary thought, and have looked around us from it, have looked down on from it? (GS, p.10)  
 
The Greeks were superficial in the sense that they dealt with surface things; they found 
meaning in the closest things, not in an abstract unity. Later Nietzsche finds meaning in this world. 
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Its groundlessness does not mean its meaninglessness. He makes room for the multiplicity of 
meanings: 
 Confidence in life is gone: life itself has become a problem.....Even love of life is still possible —only 
one loves differently (GS, p.7) 
Love is still possible, it is just that one can love differently. Meaning can be different for 
different people. 
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2. CHAPTER 2: WITTGENSTEIN 
(i) Introductory Remarks 
There is an often-told story about the change in Wittgenstein’s understanding of linguistic 
meaning and his views on language. In this thesis, I focus on the existentialist characteristics of 
this often-told story, which, I think, has been neglected in most of the Wittgenstein literature. 
Wittgenstein is known first and foremost as a philosopher of linguistic meaning, i.e. meaning in the 
semantic sense. However, I argue that Wittgenstein’s existential concerns precede his semantic 
concerns in both his earlier and later thought. There is an internal connection between his 
conceptions of linguistic meaning and existential meaning: these concepts are not accidentally 
connected. In the Tractatus, he explains how language works, how linguistic meaning is possible 
and how language represents reality. At the same time he makes an analysis of the nature of reality 
and the world. He clearly states that world and life are one (TLP, par. 5.621) and his arguments on 
the nature of the world and language reveal his views on the nature and meaning of life. He tries to 
find a common ground for both language and life.  
The discussions of existential meaning and linguistic meaning are equally explicit in the 
early Tractatus however the discussion of existential meaning is only implicit in the later 
Philosophical Investigations. We can infer Wittgenstein’s views on existential meaning in reading 
Philosophical Investigations as a book that is written to criticize the main semantic arguments —
grave mistakes, as Wittgenstein calls later (PI, Preface, p.x)— of the Tractatus. Philosophical 
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Investigations directly responds to the Tractatus’s arguments on linguistic meaning. Since 
existential and linguistic meanings are internally connected in both the Tractatus and 
Philosophical Investigations, I uncover the existential aspect of the Philosophical Investigations by 
examining his later account of semantic meaning.  
 (ii) Wittgenstein’s Existential Concerns 
  It is not hard to see Wittgenstein’s existential concerns if one makes a careful reading of 
his Notebooks, several letters he wrote to his friends, some memoirs told about him, and his 
Lecture on Ethics. These indirect resources help us understand Wittgenstein’s arguments on 
semantic meaning more clearly while providing the existential background of his 
philosophical/linguistic concerns.  
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein makes a valuation between different levels of reality and 
argues that the mystical is what is higher while the world and language take place at the lower 
level. The mystical, according to his argument, encompasses logic, ethics, aesthetics and religion. 
And the mystical is the background of reality. Logic and ethics are the main themes of the 
Tractatus. Wittgenstein’s arguments on the structure of the world, language and reality are based 
upon his conception of logic and ethics. The semantic agenda —the logical agenda— is in 
conformity with the existential agenda —ethics. In 1916, Wittgenstein writes about his Tractatus; 
“My work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world” (NB, p.79). I 
shall explain the details of the metaphysical structure of reality in the following section but for now 
I want to clarify what he means by “ethics”.   
Wittgenstein, in his “Lecture on Ethics”, in 1930, referring to Moore’s Principia Ethica, 
states that he uses the term “ethics” in a wider sense than merely the general enquiry into what is 
good: 
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Now instead of saying "Ethics is the enquiry into what is good" I could have said Ethics is the enquiry 
into what is valuable, or, into what is really important, or I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the 
meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living. I believe if you 
look at all these phrases you will get a rough idea as to what it is that Ethics is concerned with (LE, p.3). 
 
Clearly, he states that ethics is concerned with the meaning of life, what makes life worth 
living. Thus, when he talks about ethics, he actually refers to the meaning of life. Thus, the 
Tractatus’s dual agenda on logic and ethics shows us that Wittgenstein’s concerns were linguistic 
as well as existential. Using this explicit dual agenda as a reference point, I shall state 
Philosophical Investigations’s existential agenda explicitly. 
Wittgenstein’s existential concerns are explicit also in his Notebooks. The Notebooks were 
written during the First World War while he was working on the Tractatus. In that psychological 
mood he was questioning the main existential concerns of the individual while pursuing the main 
philosophical problems. If we carefully look at the notebook entries, we see that his analysis of 
philosophical and linguistic problems goes hand in hand with his existential concerns. His 
reflections on the meaning of life are parallel to his reflections on linguistic meaning: 
To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life. To believe in a God 
means to see the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in a God means to see that 
life has a meaning. The world is given me, i.e. my will enters into the world completely from outside 
into something that is already there (as for my will I don’t know yet) that is why we have the feeling of 
being dependent on an alien will. However this may be, at any rate we are in a certain sense dependent 
on what we can call God. In this sense God would simply be fate, or, what is the same thing: The world 
—which is independent of our will. I can make myself independent of fate. There are two god heads: 
the world and my independent I. I am either happy or unhappy, that is all. It can be said: good or evil do 
not exist. A man who is happy must have no fear. Not even in face of death. Only a man who lives not 
in time but in the present is happy. For life in the present there is no death. Death is not an event in life. 
It is not a fact of the world (TLP 6.43). If by eternity is understood not infinite temporal duration but 
non-temporality, then it can be said that a man lives eternally if he lives in the present (see 6.4311) In 
order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world. And that is what “being happy” means. I 
am then, so to speak in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: ‘I am 
doing the will of God’. Fear in face of death is the best sign of a false, i.e. a bad life. When my 
conscience upsets my equilibrium, then I am not in agreement with Something. But what is this? Is it 
the world? Certainly it is correct to say : Conscience is the voice of God. For example: it makes me 
unhappy to think that I have offended such and such a man. Is that my conscience? Can one say: “act 
according to your conscience whatever it may be”? Live happily! (NB, p. 74-75) 
 
In the introduction, when giving the definition of the meaning of life, I stated that the 
existence of death is the reason for our search of the meaning of our life. In this Notebook entry 
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Wittgenstein’s existential concerns revolve around death, and happiness in this world. He states 
that the world is given to him by a God, in other words he is thrown into the world by an alien 
God. It is that God who gives the world a meaning. In the face of death, we can see ourselves as a 
part of God, and the fear of death evaporates. A happy life is the one that is in conformity with the 
world. Referring to the claim of the Tractatus, according to which  the world is the totality of facts 
and language can only state the facts, Wittgenstein argues that the individual has to live in 
conformity with the world to be happy. From the Tractatus, we know that the facts of the world are 
held together by the laws of logic. We also know that both ethics and logic are parts of the 
mystical. If the world is governed by the logical laws and if a happy life is one that is lived in 
conformity with the world, we can infer that for Wittgenstein, a happy life is one that is in 
conformity with ethical rules. The following table (Table 2.1), read both vertically and 
horizontally, might be helpful for the reader in seeing how things hang together: 
Table 2.1 
Reality Linguistic Meaning Existential meaning 
Mystical/Higher?Nonsense Logical Form Ethics/Religion/Aesthetics 
World/Lower/Sense Language Life 
 
The happy life is also the one that is lived by acting according to conscience, which is the 
voice of God. A happy life, for Wittgenstein, is also the one that has a deep faith in God.23 From 
these statements, we clearly see that Wittgenstein has a metaphysical interpretation of the meaning 
of life, by stating that our life is in the hands of God. God is the reason for existence. In other 
words, the individual is in the world by God’s will, she does not have an independent existence. 
                                                 
23 In the section (iii) I will be giving an analysis of the metaphysical account of the Tractatus and its existential 
arguments. This claim will further be discussed in that section. Please refer to p. 68 for more detail. 
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The individual would not exist if God did not will it. This metaphysical interpretation is even more 
clear in the following entry which he writes few days later: 
What do I know about God and the purpose of life? I know that this world exists. That I am placed in it 
like my eye in its visual field. That something about it is problematic. That this meaning does not lie in 
it but outside it (TLP 6.41). That life is world. That my will is good or evil. Therefore that good and evil 
are somehow connected with the meaning of the world. The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the 
world, we can call God. And connect with the comparison of God to a father. To pray is to think about 
the meaning of life. I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am completely powerless. I 
can only make myself independent of the world —and so in a certain sense master it— by renouncing 
any influence on happenings (NB, p.73). 
 
To be placed in the world like an eye in the visual field means that the individual is not part 
of the world; she does not have control over events. The meaning of her life is not something she 
creates. It is outside the world, it is in the hands of God. By praying, the individual is connected to 
the higher power —God. Referring to my happiness definition in the Introduction, praying is what 
makes the individual comfortable with herself. Wittgenstein clearly states that the individual is 
powerless in the face of life; the meaning of her life is not under her control. This approach is a 
metaphysical approach to the meaning of life. These paragraphs show clearly that Wittgenstein, in 
his early thought, gives a metaphysical account of the meaning of life while at the same time 
analyzing the structure of language and reality. 
As mentioned before, Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus during the time he was a soldier in 
the First World War and he, like Nietzsche, was highly seriously affected. Louis Sass explains the 
psychological state Wittgenstein was in: 
During the World War 1, Wittgenstein was often scared, hungry, and uncomfortable, but what seems to 
have particularly galled and appalled him at this time was finding himself reduced to his creaturely 
nature, at the mercy of all the demands or trepidations of the flesh: “From time to time I become an 
animal, “he wrote in his diary “...eating, drinking and sleeping...at the mercy of my appetites and 
aversions. Then an authentic life is unthinkable” (Monk, 146). In August 1916, while serving in 
dangerous circumstances as a soldier at the front, he was inclined to see “the life of knowledge” as 
offering the only hope for happiness and for warding off the misery off the world” (NB 81). During the 
war, Wittgenstein repeatedly returned to the idea that the body belonged to the external world and that its 
welfare should therefore be a matter of indifference to him. He would repeat the following litany: “Don’t 
be dependent on the external world and then you have no fear of what happens in it (Monk, 116, also 51-
53).” (Sass, 2001, p. 112-113) 
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Having God or the mystical as a grounding of the world and life, gives meaning to one’s 
existence. Wittgenstein eases his existential anxiety during the war by placing the meaning of life 
in the hands of a greater power — God. This is the reason for his metaphysical interpretation of the 
meaning of life. This-worldly needs, for him, are lower and he places the metaphysical essence of 
the world at a higher level. The external world is full of discomfort and struggle while the 
metaphysical essence of the world is comforting. He suggests that our language is not capable of 
talking about this essence. The meaning is outside this world. However, in the Philosophical 
Investigations he changes his approach to the meaning of life by talking about the grave mistakes 
he made in the Tractatus, as we shall see in section (iv). 
 There is another anecdote that shows that Wittgenstein did not see philosophical problems 
as distinct from existential problems. He was in Bertrand Russell’s room once, pacing. Russell asks 
him “What are you thinking about? Logic or your sins?” Wittgenstein answers “Both”. He does not 
see the problems of philosophy as distinct from the problems of life. Again in a letter to Russell he 
says “How can I be a logician before being a human?” (Monk, p.123)   
Philosophy, therefore, for Wittgenstein is not only a discipline that deals with the structure 
of reality, and the relationship between language and reality, but also a way to ease our existential 
concerns. In a letter to Norman Malcolm, in November 1944, during the development of his later 
thought, Wittgenstein says: 
What is the use of philosophy if all that it does for you is to enable you talk with some plausibility about 
some abstruse questions of logic, etc., and if it does not improve your thinking about the important 
questions of everyday life (N. Malcolm, 1984, p.93). 
 
Thus it is clear that for both early and later Wittgenstein, existential problems were as 
important as the problems of philosophy. All of his work, explicitly or implicitly, has an 
existentialist agenda. In the following sections, I shall show how the existential agenda goes hand 
in hand with the semantic agenda. 
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(iii) Early Wittgenstein 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is a turning point in the history of the philosophy of language and 
analytic philosophy. In the twentieth century, philosophy went through a self-questioning and self-
analyzing process. The task, use and methods of philosophy were reassessed and the main 
arguments of traditional philosophy were questioned.  A new understanding of philosophy was put 
forward by changing the conception of the task and use of philosophy and by prescribing a new 
method for philosophy. This radical turn in the history of philosophy was pioneered by Bertrand 
Russell, G.E. Moore and Gottlob Frege. Their thought originated as a reaction to nineteenth-
century idealism. They aimed to refute idealism, according to which objects of knowledge do not 
exist independent from the subject of knowledge. They aimed to prove that our knowledge of 
objects is a result of empirical investigation. The objects have independent existence from our 
minds. P.M.S Hacker tells us in Wittgenstein’s Place in 20th Century Philosophy that,  
The main goal of these philosophers was to establish firm foundations for knowledge. They believed that 
the individual sciences are the source of all knowledge. Philosophy, according to Russell, just like 
science, aims to achieve knowledge of reality —a theoretical understanding of the world.24 He conceived 
of philosophy as one of the special sciences, like physics or psychology. The significance of 
philosophical arguments is no different than the significance of physics. In order for philosophy to 
establish firm grounds for knowledge, it should have a well structured method. This method, for Russell 
was logic: “Every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, 
is found to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, 
logical (Russell, 1914)” (Hacker, p.7). 
 
The difference of logic from the natural sciences lies in its generality and apriority. The 
theorems of logic are a priori, self evident and necessary truths. The laws of logic are general truths 
about the ultimate logical forms of reality. Things in reality behave in accordance with these 
logical laws. When we think according to these laws we think truly since these logical laws mirror 
the relationship between facts of the world and thoughts. The relationship between the entities can 
be explained by functions; logic is the science of the relations of these entities (Hacker, p.18). 
                                                 
24 Both early and later Wittgenstein was against this conception of philosophy; philosophy does not aim to search 
for knowledge, it aims at a clarification of ideas via clarification of the language. 
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Unlike absolute idealists, Russell, Moore and Frege did not conceive of philosophy as a source of 
wisdom and insight that other sciences do not have. The task of philosophy, according to their 
conception was to ensure, by analysis and logical construction, that our knowledge of reality is 
genuine and that there is no room for doubt. This task can be fulfilled only by using logic as a 
method.  
Natural language, Russell thought, is an instrument for the communication of our thoughts 
and is useful for everyday life. But it is not a good tool for philosophy since it does not explicitly 
reflect the structure of thoughts or structure of facts as logic does. Natural languages are logically 
defective since they contain vague terms that fail to represent the truths of logic. Thus natural 
language should be replaced by a logically perfect language such as Russell devises for P.M.S. 
Hacker. 
Until this time, logic had been described by Aristotle with his account of predicate logic. 
Gottlob Frege, in the late nineteen hundreds introduced a new way of dividing up the propositions. 
Frege aimed to reduce mathematics to logic. He devised a system of representation and wrote some 
strict guidelines for this system, and thereby invented symbolic logic25 (Frege, 1972). Frege 
believed that there was a logical order hidden underneath natural language. He argued that natural 
language is often ambiguous, and thus it is difficult to be accurate because some words have more 
than one meaning (Frege,1972). In a letter to Husserl Frege says: 
It cannot be the task of logic to investigate language and determine what is contained in a linguistic 
expression. Someone who wants to learn logic from language is like an adult who wants to learn how to 
think from a child. When men created language, they were at a stage of childish pictorial thinking. 
Languages are not made to match logic’s ruler (Frege, 1906).26
                                                 
25 The influence of these guidelines Frege introduced in his Begriffschrift can be seen in Wittgenstein’s 
Notebooks. 
26 Though Wittgenstein would have had no knowledge of this letter, in On Certainty he wrote an entry which 
reads as if the were replying to this statement of Frege: “I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive 
being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough 
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 Thus the traditional philosophy, so far, could not provide real knowledge since it was 
misled by everyday language. The meaning of words is ambiguous in ordinary language and they 
cannot explain the nature of reality because of this ambiguity. Logic will clarify the language and 
make it ready for empirical verifications establishing true knowledge. 
Wittgenstein’s first acquaintance with philosophers was with Frege and Russell.27 
Wittgenstein’s early thought, together with Frege, Russell and Moore, led to the development of 
logical positivism —also known as the Vienna Circle— in the 1920s and 1930s. Nevertheless, the 
logical positivists’ reception of the Tractatus was in the form of a misinterpretation, thus logical 
positivism was constructed on a misunderstanding. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein considers the 
nature of reality and its representation via language to be the true basis for doing philosophy, and 
according for it to be the purpose of philosophy. His Tractatus is constructed as a response to 
Frege’s and Russell’s arguments on the nature of reality and language. Wittgenstein does not agree 
with their claims on natural language and he treats logic from a different perspective. Also, he does 
not agree with Russell and Frege on the conception of philosophy as a science.  He criticizes 
traditional metaphysics, like Frege and Russell do, but his solutions to the problem of metaphysics 
are drastically different from theirs. The anti-metaphysicalism of the logical positivists is in the 
form of science worship, which both early and later Wittgenstein finds mistaken. The Tractatus 
itself creates another kind of metaphysics which is ignored by the logical positivists. The aim of 
the Tractatus is to find the limits of the thinkable and the unthinkable and thus to draw a limit to 
the expression of thoughts. If philosophy manages to draw this limit between the thinkable and the 
                                                                                                                                                
for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of 
ratiocination (OC, 475)”. 
27The first philosopher Wittgenstein read and was highly influenced by was Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer’s 
influence is obvious in his early thought. However, his first acquaintance with academic philosophy was through 
Russell and Frege. 
 59
unthinkable, all the philosophical problems would be solved (TLP, par. 3). Propositions of 
metaphysics, which are in the realm of the unthinkable, are non-sense and thus we should be silent 
about them. Being silent about metaphysics, which is the only way to express the mystical28 in 
Wittgenstein’s terms, does not mean that the metaphysical structure of reality does not exist; 
however it does mean that metaphysical truths are not expressible through natural language. 
Rather, metaphysical truths can only show themselves. 
The Tractatus has a dual agenda. The first one —the arguments related to the nature of 
language, logic and the picture theory of meaning— is accepted by the Vienna Circle and guided 
them in their further construction of logical positivism. But the second agenda —the metaphysical-
existential one— was ignored and thus led to the misinterpretation of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein’s 
Notebooks, 1914-1916 reflects this metaphysical-existential agenda as well as the semantic agenda, 
and serves as a good resource for understanding the Tractatus. 
In the preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein states that the book deals with the problems of 
philosophy, and shows that the main source of the problems of philosophy is the misunderstanding 
of the logic of language (TLP, par.3). The main argument of the book, he states, is “what can be 
said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence” (TLP, 
par.3). Wittgenstein lays out the metaphysical structure of reality. According to the Tractatus, the 
world has a substance, viz. ‘objects’, which are simple and not composite. They thus form the 
unalterable structure of the world (TLP, par. 2.021, 2.023, 2.024. 2.027). They form the fixed 
structure of the world that cannot be changed. Objects contain all possible combinations in 
themselves (TLP, par. 2.0271). The different configurations of objects construct states of affairs 
(TLP, par.2.0272). In a state of affairs, objects stand in a determinate relationship to one another 
                                                 
28 The mystical includes logic, ethics and aesthetics. I have a detailed discussion of the mystical in the following 
paragraphs. 
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(TLP, par. 2.031). All objects encompass all possible states of affairs as a potentiality; so all the 
relationships between objects in states of affairs are pre-determined. Objects make up the 
substance of the world; the existence of their actual configurations makes up the facts. The world 
has a fixed structure since the objects are its substance and all possible states of affairs are encoded 
into their structure (NB, p.62). If all the objects are given, then at the same time all possible states 
of affairs are given. Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs (TLP, par.2.014). 
Regarding the determinate relationship between objects, Wittgenstein states: “Things are 
independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a 
form of connexion with states of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to 
appear in two different roles: by themselves, and in propositions)” (TLP, par.2.0122). 
There is a pre-determined and fixed relationship among objects even if it is there only as a 
possibility, not actuality. Both the existence and non-existence of states of affairs make up reality 
(TLP, par.2.06). The existence of states of affairs determines the facts since a fact is the existence 
of states of affairs (TLP, par.2). The world is the totality of facts —the existence of states of affairs 
(TLP, par.1, 1.1). Wittgenstein clearly states in the Tractatus that things/ objects are not the world 
but the possible constituents of states of affairs (TLP, par. 2.011) and the existence of all the states 
of affairs —facts— is the world. This structure of reality is a logical structure; having a logical 
structure is the essence of reality. Logic is the grounding of the world. 
The totality of existing state of affairs makes up the world (TLP, par.2.04). The existence 
and non-existence of state of affairs make up the reality, and the existence of states of affairs is a 
positive fact and their non-existence is a negative fact (TLP, par.2.06). And the sum total of reality 
—the existence of states of affairs— makes up reality (TLP, par.2,063). The mystical, on the other 
hand can not be regarded as the existence of states of affairs, since it does not make up the facts. 
But it makes itself manifest (TLP, par.6.522). Thus, from these propositions of the Tractatus we 
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can infer that reality has two components: the world —the totality of facts— and the mystical. 
Logic, ethics, aesthetics, religion are parts of the mystical and they are the background of the 
world; they are what the world relies on. They have a greater value than the world or the totality of 
facts. Reality has a logical structure on which the world depends. The mystical is the metaphysical 
grounding of the world. The mystical is the paradigm of what is ‘inexpressible’ and shows itself. 
He says, “Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is” (TLP, par. 6.44). The mystical is the 
metaphysical grounding of the world and it takes place outside the world. Though this realm of the 
mystical, in which ethics takes place, is inexpressible, it can be manifested: “There are, indeed, 
things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” 
(TLP, par. 6.522). 
Logic, one of the components of the mystical, pervades reality as such: the relationship 
between objects in the shape of states of affairs, the existence of which makes up the facts and thus 
the world, is a logical relationship. States of affairs are tied to each other with a logical bond; the 
facts take place in ‘logical space’ (TLP, par.1.13). Logical space is beyond the world, it serves as 
the background of the world, and the facts —the existence of states of affairs— are the world. 
Logical space encompasses all the objects which are the substance of the world. Thus we can say, 
logical space — a part of the mystical— is the metaphysical grounding of the world.  
 Logic, because of this determinate and unchanging structure, gives a certainty to the world; 
i.e. states of affairs have a determinate inner structure. Just like logical rules, we can say, ethics 
also is present as a background in the structure of the world.29 Wittgenstein, by distinguishing the 
world from the mystical, makes a valuation of the different aspects of reality. The mystical is what 
is higher and the world is what is lower. This valuation is exhibited in his saying/showing 
                                                 
29 See the figure 2.1 on page 53. 
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distinction which is Wittgenstein’s argument that the facts of the world can be put into words 
whereas the mystical can not be stated by the language but can only be shown. What can be shown 
——the mystical— is the condition of what can be said. 
According to Wittgenstein, the totality of propositions forms language (TLP, par.4). 
Wittgenstein shares Augustine’s picture theory of language (PI, par.1). According to the picture 
theory, the main use of language is to make a description of the world —the totality of the facts. 
The main use of words is naming and the task of propositions is describing facts. The meaning of a 
word is the object it corresponds to in the world, and the meaning of a proposition is the fact it 
describes. Language can only state the facts of the world; its main use is to make descriptions. 
Language is the means to express the facts of the world. The non-factual part of reality—the 
mystical— cannot be stated with language but shows itself in language as the logical form of a 
proposition. As mentioned before, the facts have a logical structure; states of affairs are connected 
to each other in a fixed and determinate way. They have a logical structure that ties them together. 
Language has a logical structure —grammar— that mirrors the logical structure of the facts. 
Language and world have logical form in common. Logic is the common scaffolding of both 
language and the world. Without logic —the mystical— the world would not exist. But this 
common structure of reality and language cannot be stated: 
Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in 
common with reality in order to be able to represent it--logical form. In order to be able to represent 
logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, 
that is to say outside the world (TLP, par. 4.12). 
Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in language, 
language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. 
Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it (TLP, par. 4.121). 
What can be shown cannot be said (TLP, par. 4.1212). 
The existence of an internal relation between possible situations expresses itself in language by means 
of an internal relation between the propositions representing them (TLP, par. 4.125). 
 
According to the picture theory of meaning, the essential logical form of language is 
identical with the essential metaphysical form of reality. The connection between the objects in the 
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form of states of affairs reveals itself as the connection between the names and the propositions in 
the language. The grammatical structure of the language corresponds to the logical structure of the 
world. Logic is the essence of reality as well as the essence of a proposition (TLP, par. 5.4). Logic 
embraces the world; it is the world’s metaphysical essence: “How can logic —all-embracing logic, 
which mirrors the world— use such peculiar crotchets and contrivances? Only because they are all 
connected with one another in an infinitely fine network, the great mirror” (TLP, par. 5.511). 
Logic has an a priori structure, it is beyond this world: 
The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of 
things, but that something is : that, however, is not an experience. Logic is prior to every experience--that 
something is so. It is prior to the question 'How?' not prior to the question 'What?' (TLP, par. 5.552). 
 
A proposition is a statement of a fact as well as a display of the logical form. Thus, 
language mirrors reality by stating and describing the totality of facts —the world— and showing 
the logical form of the reality. We can thus say that the picture theory of meaning divides reality 
into two —the world and the mystical— by distinguishing what can be said and what can be 
shown. Wittgenstein, via the saying/showing distinction, makes a valuation between the world and 
the mystical. The world is what is lower, and language can state it. However the mystical is higher, 
so it can not be stated by the lower —language is, as it were, a device for saying.30But it can be 
shown just by the presence of language. This hierarchy in the structure of reality has existential 
meaning implications. Ethics, which is a part of the mystical, is higher. Ethics as I shall discuss in 
what follows is conceived as something pertaining the meaning of life (LE., p. 5). In so far as 
ethics is what is higher, we can infer that Wittgenstein sees the meaning of life at a higher level of 
reality than our everyday life. Thus he implies that the meaning of life cannot be attained within 
the limits of this world. 
                                                 
30 Wittgenstein’s ascribing different values to the world and the mystical, and his claim that what can be shown is 
higher than what can be said, and that language —a lower level of reality— can not state the higher, shows the 
influence of Russell’s theory of types in Wittgenstein’s thought (Sass, p.99). 
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Wittgenstein’s understanding of natural language differs from Frege’s and Russell’s. Frege 
and Russell were claiming that natural language is logically defective since it contains vague terms 
and fails to represent the truths of logic. So, for them, all philosophical statements should be 
replaced by a logically perfect language. Contrary to Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein argues that 
“all the propositions of everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order” (TLP, 
par. 5.5563).  By this he means that the propositions of our ordinary language are not in any way 
logically less correct or less exact or more confused than the propositions written down. Only it is 
easier for us to gather their logical form when they are expressed in an appropriate symbolism. 
Natural sciences, he argued, are only defective in appearance. The task of philosophy is to clear up 
the language by distinguishing what is said from what is shown. 
We can understand a proposition as long as it pictures a possible state of affairs. 
Expressions of metaphysics are meaningless since they do not depict a possible fact. The 
propositions of the natural sciences can be expressed since they correspond to facts in the world 
(TLP, par. 4.11). Only the propositions of natural sciences can be stated in language, they are 
meaningful since they may correspond to a fact in the world. However philosophy is not a natural 
science. It has a place above or below natural sciences and cannot be put in the same category as 
the natural sciences (TLP, par. 4.111) Philosophy, by clarifying the language, by distinguishing the 
expressible from the inexpressible, sets a limit to the natural sciences and eases their work (TLP, 
par. 4.113). It sets limits to what can be thought and what cannot be thought: 
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an 
activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 
'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts 
are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries 
(TLP, par. 4.112).  
 
Russell’s view of philosophy was simply “retrogression from the method of physics” (NB, 
p.44), Wittgenstein said, criticizing Russell’s conception of “scientific method in philosophy”. It is 
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the task of physics to construct theories about reality. The task of philosophy is elucidation of 
propositions by analysis. It is inconceivable for Wittgenstein that philosophy should share the 
methods of natural sciences.  There is a sharp distinction between philosophy and science, both in 
terms of their method and their products. The task of philosophy is not to describe the most general 
truths about the universe, which is the task of natural sciences like physics. The task of philosophy 
is not describing the workings of the mind either, that is the task of psychology. Nor does 
philosophy properly investigate the metaphysical nature of things. The goal of traditional 
metaphysics was to uncover necessary truths about reality, and to disclose the essence of the world.  
But this is not possible since natural language can only state the empirical discoveries of the 
natural sciences. But the metaphysical structure of reality cannot be expressed via language since it 
is at a higher level. According to the Tractatus, there are indeed metaphysical truths, but any 
attempt to state them, including that of Tractatus, transgresses the bounds of sense since language 
is not adequate to reveal them. The only thing philosophy should do in terms of the metaphysical 
truths is to be silent (TLP, par. 7). 
 This led Wittgenstein to characterize his own theory of language in the Tractatus as 
nonsense, for to say that language pictures facts is to try to give a picture of the pictorial relation 
which holds between statement and fact, which is absurd since this pictorial relation can only show 
itself, and what shows itself cannot be said. He called his metaphysics important nonsense which 
helps one to recognize it as nonsense, and thought that philosophers tend to talk nonsense because 
of the untidy character of ordinary language. Once the Tractatus is understood there will be no 
more concern for philosophy, which is neither empirical like science nor tautological like 
mathematics. The traditional problems of philosophy ask for answers to questions that are 
nonsensical. The things that traditional metaphysics tries to say are shown in the structure of the 
language itself, its logical form. Thus the correct method in philosophy (TLP par. 6.53) is not the 
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method the Tractatus used. Its method is to be discarded like a ladder which is to be thrown away 
after one has climbed up it (TLP, par. 6.54). Philosophy should construct no theories, propound no 
doctrines, and attain no new knowledge of facts. Rather it will be an activity of logical clarification 
(TLP par. 4.112) Philosophy, unlike science, is not a cognitive discipline.31 It does not contribute 
to human knowledge, but by means of logical clarification, it contributes to human understanding. 
“All philosophy is a critique of language” Wittgenstein stated (TLP par. 4.0031). Its task is to 
eliminate misunderstandings, resolve unclarities, and dissolve philosophical problems that arise out 
of confusing features of the surface grammar or natural language (TLP, par. 4.003, 4.0031). 
Regarding the task of philosophy, he ends the Tractatus with these paragraphs: 
The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be 
said, i.e. propositions of natural science--i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy -- and 
then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had 
failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the 
other person--he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy--this method would 
be the only strictly correct one (TLP, par. 6.53) 
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (TLP, par.7) 
 
The Tractatus was misinterpreted by the Vienna Circle. They developed a new 
understanding of philosophy based on Russell’s, Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s. They defined their 
view in the manifesto of the Circle: 
The scientific world-conception knows no unsolvable riddle. Clarification of the traditional 
philosophical problems leads us partly to unmask them as pseudo-problems, and partly to transform 
them into empirical problems and thereby to subject them to the judgment of experimental science. The 
task of philosophical work lies in this clarification of problems and assertions, not in the propounding of 
special “philosophical pronouncements (Manifesto, p.8)” (cited in Hacker, p.24) 
 
The method of the new philosophy, thus, was the logical analysis of science through the 
logical analysis of language. The attitude towards the problems of philosophy should be scientific 
(Hacker, p.44). The goal of the new philosophy was ‘unified science’. The Vienna Circle 
announced the demolition of metaphysics altogether. The “Scientific-Worldview” represents their 
conception of science free from metaphysics (Manifesto, p.7). (cited in Hacker, p.25) 
                                                 
31  Here Wittgenstein is against logical positivism. 
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They argued that a statement is meaningful if and only if it can be proved true or false by 
means of experience. This is the verification principle. The meaning of a statement is its method of 
verification. Metaphysical statements do not fulfill the requirement of verification, thus they are 
meaningless. The only role of philosophy is the clarification of the meaning of statements. The 
Vienna Circle demolished metaphysics and started worshipping science. Wittgenstein did not share 
the arguments of the logical positivists. The Tractatus stated that there are indeed metaphysical 
truths about the essential nature of the world. The Vienna circle disregarded this part of the 
Tractatus. For Wittgenstein, the metaphysical truths about the essential nature of the reality are 
ineffable; they are shown in the deep structure of any possible language. Language is superficial, 
the metaphysical truths about the essence of the world —in the realm of mystical— are in the deep 
structure of reality; they can only be shown.  
To sum up, for Wittgenstein, the essence of language is its function and structure. He did 
not change his understanding of the essence of language in his later thought although he changed 
his idea of the function and structure of language. The function of language is to represent the 
world and its structure is logical form. Logical form can only be shown; it cannot be said. Logical 
form guarantees a connection between the language and world. Propositions in language have a 
logical form, and they describe the facts of the world. The function of language, for early 
Wittgenstein, is making descriptions of the world. The metaphysical approach of the Tractatus 
aims to explain the connection between the world and language. He assigns the world an a priori 
structure by claiming that logic pervades reality. Ordinary language, for Wittgenstein is already 
perfect because of its perfect logical structure. Language is a spatio-temporal phenomenon but it 
has a non-spatio-temporal structure. Language can describe the facts of reality since this non-
spatio-temporal essence is also the structure of reality. Later Wittgenstein abandons this conception 
of language having a hidden ideal structure tries to convey the actual role of language in human 
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culture. His understanding of language having a sublime structure is reflected in his understanding 
of the meaning of life having a sublime structure. 
(iv)The Existential-metaphysical Dimension of the Tractatus 
Now I shall explain the part of the Tractatus disregarded by the logical positivists which is 
about what Wittgenstein calls “the mystical”. As I have already mentioned the mystical comprises 
logic, ethics, aesthetics and religion. It represents the metaphysical structure of the essence of 
reality. Wittgenstein distinguishes the mystical from the world and puts it at a higher level. 
Language and the world are on the same level, thus language can make statements —say 
something— about the world. But the mystical is ineffable and cannot be expressed through a 
lower state of reality. Ethics, logic, aesthetics, religion, and the metaphysical essence of reality are 
all different species of the same thing; they are different facets of the diamond of the mystical.  
He sees the problem of life as different from any empirical problems. Science can respond 
to the empirical questions of reality but the problem of life is not a scientific fact (TLP, par. 
6.52).In 1915, in his Notebooks he writes; 
The urge towards the mystical comes from the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. We feel that 
even if all possible scientific questions are answered our problem is still not touched at all. Of course in 
that case there are no questions any more, and that is the answer (NB, p.27). 
 
The problem of the meaning of life is not a scientific question; that is why philosophy cannot be 
one of the sciences. And the Tractatus’s emphasis on the mystical is the result of our 
dissatisfaction with science. 
Wittgenstein conceives the problem of the meaning of life as a riddle. The riddle of life is 
about the individual’s place in the world, and her relationship with the eternal reality. 
Wittgenstein’s understanding of the riddle of life includes the temporality of the soul, the 
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individual’s will32 in the world, the relationship between life and death, the possible life after death 
and happiness (TLP par. 6.43 6.431, 6.4311, 6.4312). The riddle Wittgenstein is announcing is in 
fact an existential riddle; the problems of the riddle are the existential concerns of the individual. 
He says: 
Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say of its eternal 
survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for 
which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not this eternal 
life itself as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies 
outside the space and time (TLP, par. 6.4312). 
 
The problems of life and the answers to our existential concerns, viz. the meaning of life, 
lie outside this world, at the higher level of reality, in the mystical. The problem of ethics is the 
problem of life —the existential riddle— according to Wittgenstein. Ethics, like logic, is 
transcendental and not talk-aboutable. It is a higher level of reality. Thus the answers to the 
problems of life cannot be stated from the lower level of reality, in language. If the question of the 
problem of life cannot be stated with words, the question cannot be asked either. Thus Wittgenstein 
states that the riddle of existence does not exist33: 
When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words. The riddle does 
not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it (TLP, par. 6.5) 
 
Then he continues: 
The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. (Is not this the reason why 
those who have found after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then 
been unable to say what constituted that sense?) (TLP, 6.521) 
 
The reason for the disappearance of the problem of life is the impossibility of stating it via 
language. It is meaningless to talk about ethics or the meaning of life because propositions can 
only express mere facts (LE, p.3). When there is a proposition it is a mere statement of a fact. We 
can not have an ethical truth in the description that the proposition makes. “Certainly the reading of 
                                                 
32 Wittgenstein was highly influenced by Schopenhauer in his early thought. In this context he used 
Schopenhauerian concept of “will”. 
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description might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read about the pain or 
rage caused by this murder in other people when they have heard of it, but there will simply be 
facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics” (LE, p.3).34 All the facts in the world are as they are; in them 
there is no value, the value lies outside the world, outside the facts. There is a value of life but it is 
not within the limits of the world or life, since world and life are identical in the Tractatus (par. 
5.621). What we do while we are making value judgments is seeing or experiencing the facts and 
making judgments about them, but it is meaningless because language cannot express anything 
other than the facts.  The ethical is not a fact of the world but it is a characteristic of the world.  
Wittgenstein, while talking about the mystical, does not make a clear differentiation of 
logic from ethics. They are both what is higher. In this respect, I believe that Wittgenstein’s 
conception of logic and its relation with the grammar of language implies a relationship between 
ethics and life. Ethics is a condition of life, like logic is the condition of the world. He argues that 
the world is held together by logical laws. He clearly says that “The world and life are one. (TLP, 
par. 5.621)”. As quoted earlier, in the notebook entry about God and the meaning of life, he clearly 
states that a happy life is the one that is lived in conformity with the world (NB, p.74-75). Thus, we 
can infer that a meaningful life is the one that is held together by the ethical laws. That is why 
acting according to one’s conscience, which is the voice of god, will make the individual happy 
(Notebooks, p.74-75). It will be in conformity with the metaphysical essence of the world, the 
mystical, which can be ethics, aesthetics, religion or logic. This is a metaphysical interpretation of 
the meaning of life. Propositions of language make sense as long as they have a logical form, and 
life is meaningful as long as ethical laws rule it. Let’s look at our diagram again: 
                                                                                                                                                
33 Here Wittgenstein criticizes skepticism for asking questions that cannot be answered at all (ibid. 6.51). Gordon 
Bearn analyzes both Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s thoughts in the context of scepticism.  
34 In the “Lecture on Ethics”, Wittgenstein makes a distinction between the absolute judgment of value and 
relative judgment of value in order to explain why we cannot make ethical propositions. 
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Reality Linguistic Meaning Existential meaning 
Mystical/Higher?Nonsense Logical Form Ethics/Religion/Aesthetics 
World/Lower/Sense Language Life 
 
 
Wittgenstein conceives reality as a determined whole. Logic pervades the world; logic is 
one of the main structures of reality.  Logic shows itself in the pure grammar of language, and 
ethics shows itself in the existence of life. Ethics, like logic, is a condition of reality. All the 
possible relationships between the objects in the world are encoded into their structure, and their 
configurations produce the states of affairs. Everything is determinate via laws of logic. We can 
also say that the value of the states of affairs is also determinate in the structure of life but it cannot 
be put into words such as logical laws. Logic shows itself in the structure of the language, and 
ethics shows itself in the structure of life. In order to understand the logical form one must see 
language as a whole, and in order to understand ethics, one must see the world as a whole. The 
very existence of the world is what is mystical; the value shows itself it cannot be stated. They are 
what the mystical is (TLP, par. 6.522). “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence 
(TLP, par. 7)”; that is all we can do. 
This is how Wittgenstein sees the problem of life in general, but now we should ask 
Wittgenstein what does it mean for a single individual who is concerned with her existential 
problems? What kind of answer is the Tractatus giving except saying that we can’t talk about it?  
The individual is not a part of the world but she is the limit of the world (TLP par. 5.632). 
Wittgenstein views the individual sub specie aeternitatis. The individual is not in the world, but at 
the boundary of it. Wittgenstein is a solipsist in the Tractatus.35 Solipsism is generally the view that 
                                                 
35Wittgenstein, by the influence of Schopenhauer, views the individual sub specie aeternitatis. Wittgenstein’s 
mysticism is very similar to Schopenhauer’s.  Ethics, for Schopenhauer is taking the right stance to the world as a 
whole, of viewing the correct relation between the self and the world. The self should be receiving the world 
without imposing judgmental categories on it and she should be aware of her own indivisibility from the whole 
reality. 
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I (the self) alone (solus ipse) exist(s).  This means that the self can only appear as conceived by 
solipsism as a condition of the possibility of the world. Wittgenstein says: 
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world (TLP, par.5.6). 
This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism. For what the 
solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my 
world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) 
mean the limits of my world. (TLP, par.5.62) 
I am my world. (The microcosm). (TLP, par.5.63)  
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which 
alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. (TLP, par.5.62) 
 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism in these paragraphs marks the intersection of the 
logical and the mystical parts of the Tractatus. I believe that the source of his solipsistic attitude is 
his notion of language. In the construction of language the self does not need the others, language is 
a description of the world not a communication tool. The world is the totality of facts, it is self- 
evident, everything is as it is. The essence of language is the logical form and logical form is the 
common structure of language and the world. Language reflects the world and thus it is singular. 
For Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, every one envisages the world only in so far as he or she is a 
speaker of language, in which the world can be described. There is only one language since it 
describes the world. The self has a relationship with the world as a whole, and this relationship is 
through language, the limits of an individual’s world are the limits of her language. Thus the self 
does not need others to have a world —life— or language.  
This solipsistic view throws the individual outside the world. He says: “The subject does not 
belong to the world, but is rather a limit of the world” (TLP, par. 5.632). In the Notebooks, glossing 
the remark that ‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world’, on page 49, dated 23 May 
1915, Wittgenstein immediately says this: ‘There really is only one world soul, Weltseele, which I 
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for preference call my soul and as which alone I conceive what I call the souls of others’. Then he 
goes on: ‘The above remark gives the key for deciding the way in which solipsism is a truth’.  
The individual is detached from the world; she is outside the world but she is a part of 
reality. The individual sees the facts of the world from outside, but the meaning of her life does not 
lie in the world. The individual observes and experiences the world, but not the meaning of her 
life. The meaning of one’s life lies in the mystical, thus it is sublime; it is not within the limits of 
the world. The meaning of one’s life is not attainable in this world: 
To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole--a limited whole. Feeling the world as a 
limited whole--it is this that is mystical (TLP, par. 6.45) 
The world is independent of my will (TLP, par. 6.373). 
 
The world has already a fixed structure; the individual’s existence does not change it. 
Values and the meaning of life lie outside the world, since in the world everything is as it is or 
everything happens as it does happen (TLP, par. 6.41). He continues: 
...If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is 
the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie 
within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world (TLP, 6.41). 
 
Thus, we can say, Wittgenstein says to the individual who is in search of the meaning of 
her life that the meaning does not belong to the world since in it everything is the case. 
Value/meaning lies outside the world. This kind of approach is a metaphysical approach. The 
individual is not responsible for her life. According to this approach, it is almost as if no matter 
how hard the individual tries, she cannot create the meaning of her life. Rather, the meaning of life 
is already given, living in conformity with the mystical rules—ethics, religion, etc. What these 
rules are we cannot state. Language can only express the facts, thus it can only express what is in 
the world, not what is outside, so language cannot express what is higher; it cannot express ethics 
(TLP par. 6.42): “It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics 
and aesthetics are one and the same) (TLP, par. 6.421).” 
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This abstract notion of the meaning of life does not concern individual’s daily existential 
concerns. It rather pushes the individual to look for that indefinite, unknown meaning. The 
individual, while looking for this abstract out of this world meaning, does not recognize the hidden 
meanings of everyday life. In this context, this abstract notion of the meaning of life might give a 
solid grounding to the individual by providing something to look for. Nevertheless, in the short 
run, when the individual faces the problem of having to live this day, this abstract conception of 
the meaning of life does not help. It might cause a resignation in the individual that she might not 
even want to live anymore since she does not exactly know what she is looking for, and anything 
she might find meaningful can lose its value because of not fitting the ideal picture of the meaning 
of life. In a way this conception of the meaning of life leaves the individual in a nihilistic state in 
Nietzsche’s terms. 
To sum up, for early Wittgenstein, reality has two components at two different value levels; 
the world and the mystical. There is a hierarchy of values. The world and language are at the lower 
level, whereas the mystical and the meaning of life is at the higher level. The higher is what is 
certain, determined and fixed. It is there as the metaphysical grounding of the world. He makes a 
metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life; the meaning is beyond the limits of this world, it 
is at the higher level. The idea that there is a meaning beyond this world in a realm which is greater 
than human existence gives a sense of security and safety. This metaphysical reality is hidden from 
us by a veil, but we know it is there. For the individual who has existential concerns, believing 
there is a higher realm of value in which everything has a place makes her feel secure and safe. 
Even if we cannot say what that meaning is, we know it is there because it shows itself to us by the 
existence of the world and existence of human life. The individual does not have a control over the 
structure of the world. Everything happens as it happens. This takes the responsibility of one’s own 
life away from one, thus the individual does not have to struggle with the everyday existential 
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concerns. There is a higher that takes care of all these concerns.36 Thus the individual can isolate 
herself from the rest of the world, stop struggling with the existential concerns and live a life that 
she thinks in accordance with the higher realm of reality. The Tractatus’s conclusion, in terms of 
the search for the meaning of life, pushes one to a kind of resignation, where the individual is 
encouraged to be passive, since her will cannot enter into the world, and just look at the life as it is. 
The real comfort, the Tractatus promises, is the metaphysical comfort of the mystical. It sublimes 
the meaning of life from this world to another dimension of the reality. 
(v) Later Wittgenstein 
In the preface to Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein states that he wrote the 
Philosophical Investigations to fix the grave mistakes he made in the Tractatus. He says; “For 
since the beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced 
to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book (PI, preface, x)”. 
His response to the grave mistakes of the Tractatus displays his notion of existential 
meaning in Philosophical Investigations. He directly addresses these grave mistakes in his 
understanding of the relationship between language and world, and the structure of language and 
reality. Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, turns away from his metaphysical approach 
to the nature of language and the world, and the meaning of life, to an anti-metaphysical approach 
through which he deals with the everyday use of language, and thereby, everyday life. In writing 
Philosophical Investigations, he aims to give an anti-metaphysical explanation of the language: 
When philosophers use a word —“knowledge”, “being”, “object”. “I”, “proposition”, “name”—and try 
to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way 
in the language which is its original home? — What we do here is to bring words back from their 
metaphysical use to everyday use (PI, par.116). 
                                                 
36Sass, in his article “Deep Disquietudes” links early Wittgenstein’s concerns about the certain grounding and 
meaning of life —the mystical— to his personal psychology at the time. Sass states that Wittgenstein seems to 
have had a recurrent need for withdrawal, a yearning for solitude and distant places where he might somehow 
find peace as well as escape from the possibility of theatricality or inauthenticity in social life but he again could 
not stand the isolation and being alone (Sass, p.112) 
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The grave mistakes he made in the Tractatus are related to the sublimation of the logic of 
language (PI, par. 38) which he latterly thinks of as the Augustinian picture of language (PI, par.1). 
Early Wittgenstein, following Augustine, conceives of language as primarily a means to describe 
the world. According to the Augustinian picture of language, the meaning of a word is the object it 
corresponds to and the meaning of a proposition is a fact. Propositions are pictures of the world. 
These grave mistakes of the Tractatus, as he came to regard them, are remedied by Philosophical 
Investigations’ anti-metaphysical approach to the nature of language.  
Wittgenstein starts Philosophical Investigations with a quotation from Augustine that sets 
out the picture theory of language: 
“When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this 
and I grasped that that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out.  
Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples; the 
expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of the 
voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something.  Thus, as I 
heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand 
what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express 
my own desires."  
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language.  It is this: 
the individual words in language name objects--sentences are combinations of such names.--In this 
picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning.  The meaning is 
correlated with the word.  It is the object for which the word stands. 
Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word.  If you describe the 
learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like 'table', 'chair', 
'bread', and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and 
of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself....That philosophical concept of 
meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions.  But one can also say that it is 
the idea of a language more primitive than ours (PI, par.1) 
 
The essential function of language according to the picture theory is naming and 
describing; the world and language are linked to each other as corresponding images. We can only 
state the totality of facts—the world— via language, we cannot state anything beyond facts. 
Language does not enable us to say things about the non-factual part of the reality, i.e. 
metaphysical truths about the nature of reality, ethics, logic; we can only show them. Thus, the 
function of language is naming and describing and its structure is the logical form. In 
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Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein alters this conception of language. The essence of 
language is still its function and structure however he redefines what they are (PI, par.109). He 
presents language as primarily a means of communication and understanding, rather than as a 
means of describing reality. A builder and her assistant understand each other when they just say 
the names of the tools they are requesting even without necessarily requiring explanation (PI, par. 
2). Wittgenstein regards the Augustinian conception of language as one of the primitive kinds of 
applications of language, such as showing an object to a child and giving its name. This kind of 
primitive application of language is only one aspect of language where it is used as a way of 
training the child, not necessarily communicating (PI, par. 5): 
In the practice of the use of language (2), one party calls out the words, the other acts on them. In 
instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is, he 
utters the word when the teacher points to the stone.---And there will be this still simpler exercise: the 
pupil repeats the words after the teacher-----both of these being processes resembling language. We 
can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one of those games by means of which 
children learn their native language. I will call these games “language games” and will sometimes 
speak of a primitive language as a language-game. And the process of naming the stones and of 
repeating words after someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the use of 
words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses. I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the 
actions into which it is woven, a “language game” (PI, par. 7). 
 
  He uses the game analogy in order to explain the structure of language. For example the 
whole process of using words to teach children their native language is a kind of language- game; 
or the language which the assistant and the builder use to communicate is a language game. The 
different applications of language in different contexts are language games. A language game 
consists of the language and the context of language —the people involved, the subject, the 
culture, and the environment. The focus in language is communicating and understanding, not 
explaining. The words used in the language do not necessarily correspond to objects in the world. 
The functions of the words in a language game, Wittgenstein says, are as diverse as the functions 
of tools in a toolbox (PI, par.11). The meaning of words and propositions lies in their use in the 
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language; the context of the language creates the meaning of the word. A language game is 
surrounded by a form of life: 
It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle. —Or a language 
consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others. —And 
to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life (PI, par. 19). 
 
The structure of language, according to the Tractatus was logical form, now it is the form 
of life. Logical form was single while there are various kinds of language games and forms of life. 
What Wittgenstein means by a form of life is the shared context of communication. Stanley Cavell 
gives a good explanation of what Wittgenstein means by a form of life as such: 
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to 
project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not 
the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, 
and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of sharing routes of interest 
and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is 
outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an 
assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation —all the whirl organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of 
life”. Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less than 
this. It is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying. We 
begin to feel, or ought to, terrified that maybe language (and understanding, and knowledge) rests upon 
very shaky foundations —a thin net over an abyss (Cavell, 1969, p.52). 
Wittgenstein sees language as a part of natural history. It is based on the need for 
communication. Agreement in form of life is the basis of mutual understanding. The reason for 
Cavell’s existential terror is that we are not sure whether what we want to share via language will 
be understood by the other individual or not. We are not sure if there is a mutual agreement in the 
language game. Since a form of life includes more than one individual, thus more than one 
perspective, the dynamics of the relationship are shaky. There are lots of risks that these shakable 
foundations of human communication carry. Creating a language requires a context of activity and 
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interpersonal agreement; it requires imagining the form of life of the individuals. This 
characteristic of language prevents us from assigning one single structure for the language, like 
logical form.  
This unstable nature of human communication and language raises the question of whether 
a unique definition of the meaning of life, that is valid for all forms of life, can be made.37 The 
danger of losing certitude and predictability in life and human relationships are a terrifying 
experience that human existence faces. Different forms of life contain different dynamics; thus 
different forms of life contain different meanings which can be totally distinct from each other. 
 As mentioned in the previous section, logical form is what holds language together, and 
ethical laws hold life together. Now, Wittgenstein, by introducing the concept of form of life 
abandons his conception of logical form, thus in a way abandons the idea that life is held together 
by unique set of rules. In the Tractatus, the foundations of language were provided by 
‘unanalysable’ objects, whose essences — combinational possibilities— are supposed to 
determine, in an ineffable way, the logical space of possible situations, and thereby set unalterable 
limits to what it makes sense to say. In the Tractatus, meaning was certain even though it was 
sublime and ineffable, it exists and it is one thing.  But in Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein holds that in so far as language has foundations, they are provided not by 
metaphysical atoms (PI, par. 72), but by shifting patterns of communal activity. Thus meaning can 
be created in different life patterns. Wittgenstein continues: 
But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?--- There are 
countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And 
this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language- 
games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get 
                                                 
37 Gordon Bearn uses this passage from Cavell in the preface of his book Waking to Wonder: Wittgenstein’s 
Existential Investigations. He says: “The terror that Cavell points to is the terror attendant on a complete loss of 
confidence whether anything means what we think it means, whether there is any meaning at all in the world or 
in language” (p.13) In the same book Bearn argues that later thoughts of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein allows us to 
create meaning in different senses. 
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a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.) Here the term "language-game" is meant to 
bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of  language is part of an activity, or of a life-form. 
Review the multiplicity of language games in the following examples, and in others: 
Giving orders and obeying them— 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements— 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)— 
Reporting an event— 
Speculating about the event— 
Forming and testing a hypothesis— 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams— 
Making up a story; and reading it— 
Play-acting— 
Singing catches— 
Guessing riddles— 
Making a joke; telling it— 
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic— 
Translating from one language into another— 
Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. 
It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the 
multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of 
language.  (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus) (PI, par.  23). 
 
Language is primarily an activity rather than a way to describe reality. Speaking a language 
is a part of our natural history like eating, drinking, walking and playing (PI, par. 25). The things 
that human beings engage in make up their form of life. Let’s take for example, a classroom. The 
teacher makes a joke referring to one of the previous classes and all the students laugh. They have 
a shared experience of the previous class, when the teacher says something the students know what 
he is referring to and they laugh. Language is the tool that enables this community have a shared 
experience. We perform different language games in a form of life. We engage in linguistic 
activities instinctively. We try to sustain a mutual understanding of what is said. That is why we 
sometimes explain things in different ways in order to make ourselves understood, use different 
tools, like changing our tone of voice etc.  
Wittgenstein’s notion of logical form in the Tractatus was imposing a pre-established or 
ideal structure on language, whereas with the notion of form of life Wittgenstein tries to 
understand how everyday language actually works. The notion of logical form was dealing with an 
ideal component of language whereas the notion of form of life deals with the actual language. In 
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this context, according to the picture theory, the meaning of a word was its correspondent object in 
the world and the meaning of a proposition was its correspondent fact in the world. They had 
logical form in common. But now, Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of a word is determined 
by its use in the language, “For a large class of cases-though not for all-in which we employ the 
word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.  And the 
meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer (PI, 32).” So, it is the shared 
form of life that determines the meaning of a proposition. In some cases, we explain the meaning 
of a word by simply pointing to an object, as in the picture theory, but in other cases we explain it 
in another way. The way we use language depends on the form of life. But our main goal is to 
communicate. 
Hence, we can say, the first grave mistake of the Tractatus is its conception of language, 
according to which the use of language is naming and describing things. According to later 
Wittgenstein, the idea that language is a means of naming the objects or facts is a “queer 
conception [which] springs from a tendency to sublime the logic of our language” (PI, par. 38). 
Conceiving of language as essentially a means of describing reality sublimes the logic of our 
language. We can then say that subliming the logic of language is the second grave mistake of the 
Tractatus. In the Tractatus he argues that the words in propositions are tied to each other with a 
determinate relationship just as the objects are tied to each other in the form of states of affairs in 
the world. Logic was the scaffolding of this structure. The world thus has a fixed structure, and 
logic does not include any surprises. In the Tractatus, he argues that the logical form of language is 
a mirror image of the logical form of reality. Logical form is hidden beneath the structure of 
language. Now, Wittgenstein criticizes the subliming of logic as the Platonic structure of language. 
He had thought that logic, if followed carefully, can lead us to a more accurate understanding. But 
in the Investigations he says: 
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These considerations bring us up to the problem: In what sense is the logic something sublime? For 
there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth —a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the 
bottom of all sciences. —For logical investigation explore the nature of all things. It seeks to see the 
bottom of things and is not meant to concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that. —It 
takes its rise, not from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connexions: but 
from an urge to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical. Not however, as if to this end 
we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn 
anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we 
seem in some sense not to understand (PI, par. 89). 38
 
This glorification of logic emerges, not from our need to grasp particular connections, (such as 
what specifically causes what), but a desire to find a key that will open up the secrets of the world 
for us, make it all make sense. In the Tractarian account, logic was in a way apart from this world, 
it was how the structures of the world and language should be. So actually it never served our 
everyday need, it never helped us understand the nature of language. However, the quest is not to 
uncover some new detail, but to understand something that is already before us, but confuses us 
because its mysteries are somehow veiled. What we want to understand, the use of language, is 
already before us. He continues in the Investigations: 
We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not 
towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena. We remind 
ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena Thus Augustine recalls 
to mind the different statements that are made about the duration, past present or future, of events. 
(These are, of course, not philosophical statements about time, the past, the present and the future.) Our 
investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by 
clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other 
things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. Some of 
them [misunderstandings] can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may 
be called an "analysis" of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a 
thing apart. (PI, par. 90) 
 
When we think that logic is superior, we feel as if we should break through the mysteries of 
what is before us with the power of logic, but we do not actually look at what is already in front of 
us.   So our investigation is not based on observations of new data.  Instead, it is a study of the 
things we say or have said about this subject.  Our purpose is to clear away certain 
misunderstandings that seem to block clarity about whatever interests us.  This means that our 
                                                 
38 Later Wittgenstein also criticizes the science worship of the Logical Positivists, and this passage is written as 
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study is a grammatical one in the sense that we might think over the meaning of certain terms, or 
the connection between different terms, and remind ourselves of the criteria for different 
application of these terms.  In order to ease our communication, in order make ourselves 
understood, we need to play around language, we do not need to try to fit into an abstract notion of 
logical form. The desire to fit language in an abstract logical form was the idea that logic will 
clarify our misunderstandings. Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations sees this as such:  
But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our forms of language, 
and so a single completely resolved form of every expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression 
were, essentially unanalyzed; as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. 
When this is done the expression is completely clarified and our problem solved. It may also be put like 
this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we 
were moving towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real goal of 
our investigation (PI, par. 91). 
With a continuous search for exactness we cannot really get anywhere since all 
explanations come to an end at some point. There is not a certain picture of logical form we can get 
at. We use language to communicate and once we understand what another person says or once we 
are understood, we stop. He continues: 
This finds expression in questions as to the essence of language, of propositions, of thought.—For if we 
too in these investigations are trying to understand the essence of language —its function, its structure, 
—yet this is not what those questions have in view. For they see in the essence, not something that 
already lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something lies beneath 
the surface. Something that lies within, which we see when we look into the thing, and which analysis 
digs out. ‘The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask: “What is 
language”, “What is proposition?” And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all; and 
independently of any future experience (PI, par. 92) 
 
Our obsession with exactness shows itself when philosophers ask about the essence of 
language in that they often strive for more exactness.  They are seeking something deeper that will 
be unveiled as the mysterious structure of language, but Wittgenstein in the Investigations seeks 
something that might be clear to us by a certain rearrangement of the details. If we ask questions 
about the essence of things, we look for answers that can be given now and for all time, regardless 
                                                                                                                                                
response to their misunderstanding of what Wittgenstein means by logic. 
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of what happens in the future.  And according to this, the essence of language cannot change. If 
language has an essence it exists everywhere and whenever language exists.  But Wittgenstein does 
not agree with this notion of a non-changing essence of language.  He says that we should look at 
changeable aspects of language that happen to create patterns in our cultural experience.  Thus the 
structure of language in Wittgenstein’s new conception is not something beneath and which 
analysis digs out. He is now against the idea that the structure of language—logic— is hidden from 
us. Rather, it is in front of our eyes; we use it to understand something. The Tractatarian account of 
logic as abstract, transcendent and unattainable is now abandoned. Philosophical Investigations 
says that logic cannot be abstract or outside the language and world; rather it is used in the 
language. It is not outside the language. 
 He comes to argue that the function and the structure of the language—its essence— lies 
on the surface, it is hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. We do not have to look for 
something sublime and deep in order to understand the structure of our language. Its essence is 
hidden on the surface of its everyday use. He says: 
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and 
familiarity. (One is unable to notice something —because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real 
foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him. —
And this means: we fail to be struck by, what once seen, is most striking and most powerful (PI, par. 
129) 
 
These arguments make up the semantic aspect of Philosophical Investigations. How do 
these statements have existential implications? Logic is considered to be sublime in the Tractatus 
since it lies at the bottom of everything, viz. all the factual states of the world and nonfactual states 
of the mystical. The mystical is also about ethics; viz. the meaning of life (LE, p.5-7). Logic lies at 
the bottom of the meaning of life as well (also world and life are one according to the Tractatus 
(TLP, par. 5.621). A meaningful sentence is the one that is made according to the rules of logic and 
we already inferred that this is saying that a meaningful life is one that is lived according to the 
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ethical laws.39 According to the Tractatus, as mentioned before, understanding the 
essence/structure of language means also understanding the essence/structure of life since logic is 
the pure intermediary between language and life. According to the Tractatus, the essence of 
language lies beneath the surface of phenomena and analysis digs it out (PI, par. 92). However in 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein, by replacing the abstract notion of logical form with 
the notion of form of life, also abandoned the idea that a meaningful life is the one that is lived in 
conformity with the ethical rules. The abstract notion of logical form implies that the meaning of 
life lies outside this world. The notion of logical form puts the emphasis outside human experience 
while the notion of form of life is inherent in human existence. The focus is back on human life. 
But with the notion of form of life, the meaning of life is included as an aspect of everyday life. 
There is a parallel between language game and life. Living contains different experiences. Each of 
these experiences has its own culture. These experiences have their own inner structure which is 
not exactly the same as the other one. Wittgenstein, in his metaphysical approach to the meaning of 
life regarded the meaning of life as outside this world, at a higher level, thus unattainable. World 
—life— and language were at the lower level and thus they couldn’t contain the meaning. Now, 
with his conception of form of life, he puts the meaning of life back into the everyday details of 
life. The meaning of life is still special and important but it is not something abstract and hidden 
behind the veil. Rather it is to be found in the form of life amongst other things. Outside life there 
cannot be any meaning. The meaning of life is in life, in its everyday randomness. There is no 
beyond-this-world metaphysical reality where we can find the meaning of life.  By denying the 
hiddenness of the rules of language Wittgenstein also denies the dogmatic approach to the meaning 
                                                 
39 Refer to the table 2.1 on p.53. 
 
 86
of life. The meaning of life can vary, it is not fixed. The meaning of life, accordingly is here in this 
world, on the surface, in the context of our life. 
Now, it is time to give more detail about his conception of language as a game. 
Wittgenstein discusses what ties games together, and asks if there is a common feature of all 
games. The answer is no. The games are connected by different sorts of similarity, but they do not 
have one unique feature that defines all of them. They are similar to each other as family members 
are. Language-games, like ordinary games, do not have a single feature that is the same for all of 
them either. Some games are closer to each other than the rest of the games, as far as their rules are 
concerned but none of them has a unique common rule. Wittgenstein calls the similarities between 
different games family resemblances (PI, par.67): 
 Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations.-For someone might 
object against me: "You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have 
nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all 
these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very 
part of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part about the general form of 
propositions and of language."  And this is true. Instead of producing something common to all that we 
call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the 
same word for all, —but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of 
this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language". I will try to explain this (PI, par. 
65). 
 
Languages do not have a unifying characteristic or essence, they each have distinct set of 
rules. They do not share a fixed logical form in common. The main characteristic of form of life is 
the fact that it is based on a shared experience, it pertains agreement on the shared experience. But 
each form of life requires different kinds of agreements. Like games, forms of life have different 
characteristics, and one single rule does not govern them. Forms of life and languages require an 
agreement but the characteristic of this agreement can be different in each form of life. 
 This notion of agreement is the basis of Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument. 
Wittgenstein, with his argument of rule following opposes to the Platonist conception of language, 
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i.e that language has an abstract unique essence. Wittgenstein argues that for a proposition to be 
meaningful, it needs to be rule-governed. Linguistic meaning is based on rule following. 
Understanding the meaning of a proposition is knowing the rules it is governed by. Agreement is 
the basis of rule following. Wittgenstein states: 
The word “agreement” and the word “rule” are related to one another, they are cousins. If I teach 
anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other word with it (PI, par. 224). 
The use of the word “rule” and the use of the word “same” are interwoven. (As are the use of 
“proposition” and the use of “true”.) (PI, par. 225) 
 
Thus, according to Wittgenstein linguistic meaning requires an agreement upon the rules 
followed. The same word can mean different things in different contexts if the rules the 
propositions are governed by are distinct from each other. According to the Tractatus, the meaning 
of words and propositions are governed by a single rule. This rule is the requirement of a 
correspondent object or fact in the world. A person has to apply that rule in future expressions to 
make up meaningful sentences. In the lack of the condition of that rule —picturing the objects or 
facts— she cannot speak. In order to make up meaningful sentences we needed to obey this pre-
determined rule. But now Wittgenstein abandons this notion and starts to deal with the actual use 
of language. Meaning is simply its use in the language game, and each language game has different 
rules. These rules based on an agreement not a pre-established fixed rule.  
Wittgenstein focuses on human experience in the Philosophical Investigations. Rule-
following is a learning experience. If agreement in the language game is not established then we 
can change the rules. The rule is dependent on the agreement in the form of life: 
Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light here? We can easily imagine people 
amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing 
many without finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one 
another with the ball and bombarding one another for a joke and so on. And now someone says: The 
whole time they are playing a ball-game and following definite rules at every throw. And is there not 
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also the case where we play and-make up the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we 
alter them-as we go along 40(PI, par. 83). 
 
According to the Tractatus, language was limited to one kind of game: describing the facts of the 
world; thus there was one single rule to be followed all the time. And this unique rule did not 
include the expression of the mystical. Now Wittgenstein asserts that we do not need a single rule, 
and we can make up the rules as we go.  
Thus the same proposition or expression can have different meanings in different contexts. 
The meaning of an expression is its use in the language game. The most important aspect of the 
meaning is its shared life form since the main task of language is to facilitate understanding. 
This is how Wittgenstein’s understanding of linguistic meaning changed, form a metaphysical 
perspective to an anti-metaphysical one.  He still defines his aim as defining the essence – the use 
and function— of language but we are turning the whole examination around this fixed point: 
We see that  what we call “sentence” and “language” has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the 
family of structures more or less related to one another. —But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour 
seems to be giving way here. —But in that case doesn’t logic altogether disappear? —For how can it lose 
its rigour? Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigour out of it. —The preconceived idea of 
crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis 
of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.) The 
philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in exactly the sense in which we speak of them in 
ordinary life when we say e.g. “Here is a Chinese sentence” or “ No, that only looks like writing; it is 
actually just an ornament” and so on.  
We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-
temporal chimera.[Note in margin: Only it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of 
ways]. But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, 
not describing their physical properties. 
The question “What is a word really?” is analogous to “What is a piece in a chess?” (PI, par. 108) 
 
Logic was conceived as pure since it was thought to be the common structure of both 
reality and language. It was considered as transcendent and sublime. Our task is still the same, to 
understand how language works in the world. But now, we do not conceive the logic of language 
as sublime. Language is a spatio-temporal communicative activity; it is not sublime or 
transcendent. Wittgenstein brings language back to the midst of human experience.  
                                                 
40 My italics 
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Now, we can look at its existential implications. The Tractatarian conception of logic as a 
crystalline purity put the mystical higher and the world and language lower. The valuation between 
the different levels of reality was made. As the other component of the mystical, ethics, was also 
put at a higher level and conceived as pure, abstract, transcendental and beyond this world. The 
essence of language was logical form, it was higher and not expressible. He was assigning one 
kind of rule to language. In Philosophical Investigations, by abandoning the idea of the crystalline 
purity of logic, Wittgenstein effectively abandons the conception of ethics as transcendental and 
abandons the idea that the meaning of life is at a higher level that cannot be found within the limits 
of this world. Our task is to understand the structure of language. The existential implication of our 
task is that language is a human activity, it is an essential part of life if not the whole of it. 
Understanding how language works is also understanding how life works. How does the language 
work in his new argument? Language is a rule guided activity, but the rules are based on shared 
experience and agreement. Rule-following is a learning experience; old rules are given up once 
they are not useful anymore. This is how life actually works. We live in a community, we have 
shared experiences with the rest of the society. Our phenomenological structure is shaped by the 
existence of others. Living in a community is human beings’ main characteristic, that is what 
makes them themselves. What kind of rules are there in life? We pick up some attitude towards 
something and it might be understood by the rest of the group or it might not be understood. We 
change our attitude when we feel like what we say does not make any sense to the other. We set up 
different rules. We learn as we go along. The meaning of life, in this context, like linguistic 
meaning is based on experience. It can be one thing at one time, another thing at another time. It is 
to be found in the narrow streets of everyday experience. With Wittgenstein’s new conception of 
language, we can say that the meaning of life is put back within the limits of the world again. 
Saying that the rules of language are not determinate, we make up the rules as we go along means 
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the meaning of life is not something fixed and unchangeable and beyond this world. Rather, the 
meaning of life is in our everyday life and we create it as we go along. 
At this point, I shall discuss Wittgenstein’s response to the solipsism of the Tractatus. 
According to the Tractatus, a person does not need others to build language since the logical form 
of the language is the form of the world, and once the individual grasps that logical form he can 
create his language. Thus, one can create a ‘private language’. But according to the Philosophical 
Investigations, language is based on interpersonal agreement, so private language is not possible: 
... ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not 
possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing 
as obeying it (PI, p.202). 
The word “agreement” and the word “rule” are related to one another, they are cousins. If I teach 
anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it (PI, par.224) 
The use of the word “rule” and the use of the word “same” are interwoven. (As the use of “proposition” 
and the use of “true”.) (PI, par. 225)) 
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” —It is what human 
beings say that is true or false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in 
opinions but in form of life (PI. Par.241). 
 
Language is essentially social according to Wittgenstein’s argument. Propositions have 
meaning only insofar as we have a criterion of their correctness. The criterion of correctness is the 
agreement in the form of life. This can be agreeing on the colour of the sky or the warmth of the 
weather. If the social practices of the individuals were not connected it would not be possible to 
have agreement on the form of life and thus there would be no language. The essence of language, 
its function, is to establish communication. Rule-following regulates the communication. Rule 
following is not reflective, it is spontaneous and based on instinctual reactions. For example I tell 
my friend what I have done yesterday, I use a name of my friend that she doesn’t know, she 
doesn’t understand whom I am referring to, so I jump into another way of explaining my friend to 
her like saying “ Do you remember the guy who was Jesus in the “Jesus Christ Superstar”” etc. I 
find a way to explain things to my friend by creating rules as I go. Private language is impossible 
since there would not be agreement based on the shared experience. 
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Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the form of life, rule-following and his opposition to private 
language have existential implications. First of all, it is clear that he keeps emphasizing the 
centrality of human experience in language and thus in philosophy. Linguistic meaningfulness is 
conditional upon agreement in the form of life and in rule following. And linguistic meaning is not 
distinct from existential meaning. If the meaning of a proposition is determined by its use in the 
context, the meaning of life is determined by the context of life. In setting out goals to be attained, 
dreaming about the things we want to experience we in fact set up some rules. These plans give a 
certain meaning to our everyday life. We get excited, we look forward to something. They help us 
live the day. But then after a while we give up the plans we made and start new ones. We have a 
freedom in our choices. But each of them happens in the context of life. Sometimes small things 
make us happy; sometimes even the largest things cannot help. The meaning of life is not at the 
higher level, it is at the ground of life. 
The double sidedness of the existential and linguistic meanings reveals itself in the 
solipsistic account of the Tractatus. Following the parallel between the linguistic meaning and 
existential meaning so far, we saw that the Tractatus’s account of linguistic meaning does not 
involve anyone besides one’s self. Presumably by saying “The world is my world”, Wittgenstein 
does not include any other individual in the meaning of one’s life. Meaning can be created within 
one’s relationship with a higher reality, without any human contact. According to the Tractarian 
account of meaning, linguistic meaning is conceivable even if there were only one mind. Parallel to 
this the meaning of an individual’s life does not involve anyone else. In the Philosophical 
Investigations, by arguing against the possibility of a private language, Wittgenstein also denies 
that the meaning of life can be found in an individual’s relationship with a higher reality, without 
society. Existential meaning is conceivable in this world, being among people. 
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Later Wittgenstein thus abandons the higher/ lower distinction between the world itself and 
the grounding of the world —the mystical. There is no metaphysical ground of the world. 
Language does not only express what is the case it also can express what is not the case, since its 
task is not limited to describing the world anymore. Language is a human activity. We ask 
questions, tell our ideas, and make jokes. These make sense only in so far it is shared with a 
community of people. We can not find or create meaning —either linguistically or existentially— 
apart from others. We can talk about the meaning of life; it is a part of our existence. We do not 
need to make a clear definition of what it is, we can just talk about it. We can talk about how it is 
attainable or not attainable. We can find meaning in yellow tulips or we can find meaning in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy or we can even find meaning in playing instead of working.  
Wittgenstein, by bringing words from their metaphysical place back to their everyday use, 
abandons the distinction between what can be said and what can be shown. The distinction 
between the higher and lower realms of reality is not true. Everything is at the same level, at the 
surface; there is no hidden structure of reality behind the veil. The meaning of life is not at 
somewhere beyond what we experience in this world. We have to be in contact with the world, 
with people, with different cultures in order to find the meaning of our lives. There is no unique 
structure of reality that in order to be happy we should live in accordance with.. His metaphysical 
interpretation of the meaning of life is totally abandoned in identifying the grave mistakes of the 
Tractatus.  
There are different certainties and grounds of different life forms. What Wittgenstein is 
opposed to is “the concept of some ideal exactitude given us a priori, as it were. At different times 
we have different ideals of exactitude; and none of them is supreme”(OC, p. 37). If there are 
different life forms and different language games and each of them can be guided by different sets 
of rules, then there can be different ways to talk about ethics or the meaning of life. Language is 
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not considered as functioning only for the purpose of the explanation of facts but a way of 
communication. So we can talk about ethics too.  Once we get rid of the Augustinian conception of 
language we can form different language games to talk about all dimensions of life, including 
ethics. Ethics or the life forms do not have a singular characteristic. The rules they are guided by 
are not fixed; they can change, they can be more than one kind. The second period of 
Wittgenstein’s thought gives more room to diversity and different groundings and different 
meanings of life. He pulls the meaning of life from heaven down to “the rough ground”.  
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3. CHAPTER 3: NIETZSCHE AND WITTGENSTEIN 
(i) A Summary 
There are philosophies which, however difficult they may be, are in principle easy to teach and to learn. 
Of course, not everyone can teach or learn philosophy —any more than higher mathematics; but the 
philosophies of certain philosophers have this in common with higher mathematics: they present the 
simple alternative of being either understood or not understood. It is, in the last analysis, impossible to 
misunderstand them. This is true of Aristotle, or St. Thomas Aquinas, or Descartes, or Locke, or Kant. 
Such philosophers are like mountains: you climb to their tops or you give up; or like weights: you lift 
them or they are too heavy for you. In either case you will know what has happened, and “where you 
are”. But this is not so with the thought of Plato, or St. Augustine, or Pascal or Kierkegaard, or 
Nietzsche. Their philosophies are like human faces on the features of which are inscribed, disquietingly, 
the destines of souls; or like cities rich in history. “Do you understand Kant?” is asking “Have you been 
to the summit of Mount Blanc?” The answer is yes or no. “Do you understand Nietzsche?” is like asking 
“ Do you know Rome?” The answer is simple only if you have never been there. The trouble with 
Wittgenstein’s thinking is that it sometimes looks like Descartes’s: you believe you can learn it as you 
learn logic or mathematics; but it almost always is like Pascal’s: you may be quite sure you cannot 
(Heller, p.142) 
 
Both Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s thought, when the multifaceted nature of their analysis 
of reality and multidimensional approach to the traditional problems of metaphysics and science 
are considered, give us the feeling that we are lost in the streets of Rome or Prague: at times we 
feel like we have found the cathedral we have been looking for but then we find out that we are in 
front of another cathedral as striking as the one we are looking for and cannot take our eyes away 
from it. In both Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s thought, there are many different ways to explore 
the nature of reality and the structure of the world. They both talk about existential meaning by 
using different approaches and analyses. I have tried to show the similarity of their approaches to 
the meaning of life and the purpose of existence. The exciting journey of the analysis of their 
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approach to the nature or reality and the meaning of life in this thesis enabled me to wander around 
the narrow streets of their thought without feeling the anxiety of getting to somewhere.  
In the first chapter, I argued that Nietzsche makes a metaphysical interpretation of the 
meaning of life and the nature of reality. In his later philosophy, criticizing this perspective, he 
develops an anti-metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life and the nature of reality. I 
showed the nature of this shift by focusing on his critique of the age he is living in and his 
conception of Greek society as creating a sublime culture. Early Nietzsche argues that the cure for 
the sickness of his age lies in going back to Greek roots. The reason for the sublime Greek culture 
is the Greeks’ perception and creation of art. The essence of artistic creativity is the tension 
between the Dionysian and Apollonian powers. In spite of this tension, they form a primordial 
unity —Ur-Eine— which is the metaphysical comfort of the culture. Nietzsche criticizes the 
metaphysics of the philosophers before and during his time, as well as the science worship of the 
Enlightenment Age, yet he himself, as he admits later, creates another kind of metaphysics: 
“artist’s metaphysics”. The meaning of life is art; art is used as the justification of life. Later 
Nietzsche criticizes this conception and makes a point of denying all kinds of metaphysics. His 
later interpretation of the meaning of reality is an anti-metaphysical one. 
Although not seen at first glance, Wittgenstein goes through a similar change in his thought 
and his conception of the meaning of life and the nature of reality. In the second chapter, I 
analyzed the change in Wittgenstein’s approach to existential meaning through analyzing his main 
linguistic arguments on linguistic meaning. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein analyzes the nature of 
reality and the relationship between language and reality. Interpreting language as the means of 
describing reality, he says that language can only state the facts of the world. Reality has two 
aspects: the world and the mystical. The world, in Wittgenstein’s analysis is at a lower level than 
the mystical. Logic, which is the mystical, is the governing structure of reality, and it shows itself 
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in the structured nature of the world and language. Language and world have a logical form in 
common. The meaning of life is an ethical issue and takes place in the same realm as logic. The 
meaning of life cannot be stated but it can show itself. The answer to the question of the meaning 
of life is mystical, thus it is at a higher level than the world. Since language can only state the facts 
it takes place at the lower level and is not capable of stating the meaning of life. This is a 
metaphysical interpretation of meaning. Philosophical Investigations is written in the form of a 
response to the main arguments that are made in the Tractatus. The Investigations, explicitly points 
out the grave mistakes made in the Tractatus about the nature of reality especially the nature of 
language, and criticizes the viewpoint of the Tractatus, but it does not directly point out the 
existential concerns. However, knowing that Wittgenstein has a double sided agenda in the 
Tractatus —existential and linguistic— we can interpret the criticisms against his earlier 
conception of language as a criticism of the existential aspect of the Tractatus.  Later Wittgenstein 
denies the sublimation of logic and he introduces the concept of ‘form of life’ into his discussion 
on language. Language, in his later thought, is a part of the natural history of human beings and is 
fundamentally a means of communication. Language is based on the agreement in the form of life 
and linguistic meaning is dependent on the context of this form of life. Wittgenstein’s new 
conception of language is reflected in the change in his concept of existential meaning. The 
meaning of life, in his new philosophy is not to be found in an abstract, transcendent beyond this 
world reality but rather it is to be found in this world, in everyday reality —which is necessarily 
‘public’, not ‘private’ (solipsistic). Wittgenstein takes the meaning of life back from the mystical, 
and brings it back to this world, and argues that it is something attainable within the limits of this 
world.  
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein gives examples from everyday life, e.g. he 
talks about the worker and the man working at the grocery store. In other words, even only by 
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looking at the language he is using, we can say that he is more concerned about the meaning of our 
everyday lives rather than the metaphysical and transcendent meaning he talks (or does not talk) 
about in the Tractatus. 
Both philosophers were influenced by the political structure of their age, and the content of 
their books reflect that atmosphere. There is a similarity between the political and cultural 
atmosphere of Europe during the time Nietzsche and Wittgenstein developed their thoughts. 
Nietzsche writes his Birth of Tragedy during the Franco-Prussian war and in this work he criticizes 
the cultural and political milieu of his age. Wittgenstein, like Nietzsche, wrote his book during the 
time of war. Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus during the First World War and his approach to 
philosophical problems was highly influenced by the pessimistic atmosphere of European society. 
In this respect, both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein start philosophizing at a similar point. While 
criticizing the dogmatism of science and traditional metaphysics, they both create another kind of 
metaphysics in their earlier thought. While trying to run away from the dogmatism of science and 
metaphysics Nietzsche finds himself creating an artists’ metaphysics while Wittgenstein finds 
himself discerning a metaphysical essence of the reality. Wittgenstein states that the meaning of 
life is identical with God. Nietzsche, although he announces the death of the Christian God, creates 
another kind of art deity in the form of Ur-Eine which gives metaphysical comfort to our 
existential restlessness. They both have a metaphysical interpretation of reality and the meaning of 
life at this point. They both make a distinction between levels of reality and rank them according to 
their value, and the meaning of life for both of them is beyond this world, at a higher level. 
Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s thoughts went through a transformation without a change in 
the subject. In early Nietzsche the question of the meaning of life is less explicit than in his later 
works. In the Birth of Tragedy he mainly focuses on the Greek conception of life and art, and 
creates an artists’ metaphysics to explain the nature of reality. However his analysis of reality has 
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important implications for his conception of the meaning of life. We understand his existential 
concerns in the Birth of Tragedy when we familiarize ourselves with his later works, especially the 
ones he wrote as a response to the Birth of Tragedy, such as the preface to the second edition of the 
Birth of Tragedy that is called “Attempt at a Self-Criticism”, Human All Too Human, Twilight of 
the Idols and the Gay Science. The existential concerns are discussed more explicitly in his later 
works. It is interesting to note that for Wittgenstein, the explicitness of the discussion of the 
existential meaning is in a reverse order compared to Nietzsche. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus has more 
explicit discussion of the meaning of life than Philosophical Investigations. Yet the trend in their 
approach was similar. 
Both philosophers see philosophy as a way to discover different aspects of reality; the task 
of philosophy is not making assertions about the nature of reality but to enable the curious 
individual wander around. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein states, “A 
philosophical problem has the form: “I don’t know my way about (PI, par. 123).” 
This is a way to read philosophical problems as existential problems. Our main existential 
concern is to find a meaning for our life and to figure out where we want to go. How do we do 
this? 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our 
words. —Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just 
that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connexions’. Hence the importance of finding and 
inventing immediate cases. The concept of  perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance 
for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 
‘Weltanschauung’?)(PI, par. 122) 
 
Wittgenstein writes this fragment in order to explain how we can understand the meaning 
of a proposition. The grammar of a sentence does not reveal its meaning unless we analyze the 
sentence based on its living context. Understanding requires seeing the connections; it is the only 
way we can have a clear idea of what the proposition means. In order to see the connections we 
need to have a ‘bird’s eye point of view’ which would build up our “Weltanschauung”, viz. the 
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way we see things. We need to look at the sentence in the context of the form of life. The 
existential implication of this passage is not hard to see. The way we conceive the meaning of life 
is a matter of our perspective. Sometimes in our search for the meaning of life we try to find a pre-
established and singular structure of life. In this process we may find ourselves in a fog since we 
are unable to see the connections and then got lost in the details. At that time we need to look at 
things from a different perspective, in order to have a lucid understanding. Our perspective 
determines what we see as the meaning of life.  
Wittgenstein uses a city analogy to describe the nature of language: 
Do not troubled by the fact that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If you want to say that this 
shews them to be incomplete, ask yourself whether our language is complete; —whether it was so 
before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; 
for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before 
a town begins to be a town?) Our language may be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and 
squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded 
by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses (PI, par. 18). 
 
Sometimes in order to find the way in an unknown city we need to look at the map —which 
was drawn from a bird’s eye perspective— for directions. Similarly when we get lost in the 
everyday concerns of life, and feel like we lost control of the ongoing events of our life we need to 
look at things from another perspective. It helps us finding the meaning of life. Sometimes it 
doesn’t: 
Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach 
the same place from another side and no longer you know your way about (PI, par. 203). 
Life, like language is a labyrinth, sometimes we find our way out of the labyrinth, 
sometimes not. Sometimes we create another labyrinth in the existing labyrinth and we totally get 
lost, or sometimes we find a much easier way. 
Science is not concerned with helping us to figure out the way we want to go, but it can be 
one of the ends we want to reach, it can be something that we define as the meaning of our life: 
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scientific investigation of the nature of reality. But philosophy helps us to figure out the way we 
want to go: 
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of any possible interest to 
us to find out empirically ‘ that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such’ 
—whatever that they mean. (The conception of thought as a gaseous medium). And we may not advance 
any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with 
all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say 
its purpose from the philosophical problems. These are of course, not empirical problems; they are solved 
rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those 
workings in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved not by reporting new 
experience, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment 
of our language (PI, par. 109) 
 
Philosophy helps us to find the way we want to go or maybe the way back home: 
When philosophers use a word —“knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name” —and try 
to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself :is the word ever actually used in this way 
in the language which is its original home?— What we do is to bring words back from their 
metaphysical to everyday use (PI 116). 
 
The way we are looking for is not something “unattainable”, “transcendent”; it is not 
somewhere beyond the borders of the city, it is the ways we pass by everyday. Sometimes we get 
lost sometimes we find the way we want to walk in. This can only be achieved by looking for the 
way within the limits of our existence. Nietzsche has the same concerns about existence and the 
meaning of life. Pointing out the abyss the individual faces in her search for meaning, he says: 
Confidence in life is gone: life itself has become a problem.....Even love of life is still possible —only 
one loves differently (Gay Science, p.7). 
 
There is a problem about life but there are different ways to figure out the way we want to 
go, we just have to keep in mind that there are different ways to lead us to Rome. Wittgenstein 
says: 
Working in philosophy —like work in architecture in many aspects— is really more a working on 
oneself. On one’s own interpretation. On one’s way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them). 
(CV, p 1931, p.16e) 
 
In his preface to the second edition of the Gay Science, Nietzsche contemplates the task of 
philosophy and the philosopher: 
I still expect that a philosophical physician, in the exceptional sense of the word —one who applies 
himself to the problem of the collective health of peoples, periods, races, and mankind generally— will 
 101
some day have the courage to follow out my suspicion to its ultimate conclusions, and out to venture on 
the judgment that in all philosophizing it has not hitherto been a question of ‘truth’ at all, but of 
something else, —namely of health, futurity, growth, power life...(p.5) 
 
Both Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein approach the philosopher, as a figure who gives 
remedies for a sick individual who got lost in her search for meaning.  Further, they both conceive 
philosophy as a discipline assisting us to find our way about.41 Wittgenstein says: 
...The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. —
The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in 
question. —Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be 
broken off. —Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem. There is not a 
philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies (PI, 133). 
 
Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus that the metaphysical truths cannot be explained since 
they are the higher and language and the world is lower. With respect to the higher, Wittgenstein 
says that we should only be silent about them; we cannot state the metaphysical meaning of life 
with language. Nietzsche also makes a similar valuation between different levels of reality in The 
Birth of Tragedy. He gives long explanations of the importance of the primordial unity which are 
of great value. Instead of being silent, he talks about them ‘loftily’: 
 Concerning great things one should either be silent or one should speak loftily: —loftily— that is to 
say, cynically and innocently (WP, Preface 1). 
 
In their later thoughts, both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein criticize their earlier approach to 
the nature of reality and the meaning of life for being a metaphysical approach. Instead of a 
dogmatic attitude to the nature of reality and the meaning of life they develop an anti-metaphysical 
and more dynamic approach. Like Nietzsche, Wittgenstein comes to argue that we do not need a 
metaphysical ground in order to establish meaning. They both show that there can be different 
ways to attain meaning. We do not require a single grounding in order to cure our feeling of getting 
lost; an anti-metaphysical approach to our existential concerns may as well make us feel like we 
have more than one home, more than one ground.  
                                                 
41 Marshall and Peters argue that Wittgenstein is the cultural physician that Nietzsche is talking about. 
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(ii) The Significance of the Similarity Between Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s Approaches 
The similarity of the trend in Wittgenstein’s and Nietzsche’s philosophical thoughts about 
the meaning of life is significant since their later anti-metaphysical approach gives more room for 
the diversity in the meaning of life. In their earlier thought, they both have a dogmatic approach to 
meaning, and prescribe one kind of medication for the existential sicknesses of human beings, 
while in their later thought, instead of writing a single prescription, they show different ways to 
cure our illnesses. Writing only one prescription carries a big risk of not curing the illness but 
leaving the individual even sicker if she cannot tolerate the medication or does not take the right 
amount. But showing the multiplicity of ways to cure one’s existential self is a more efficient cure 
since the individual can pick up the medication which will work best for him. In this case the risk 
is that the individual might need to try different medications before coming to the right one, and 
during the process she may hurt herself. But in the end the medication, if it is found, will be the 
right one for that individual. It will be determined by the choices of the individual and individual 
will have the freedom to change it whenever she likes. Wittgenstein says to the philosopher: 
“Anything your reader can do for himself leave to him” (CV, 1948, p.77e). In a similar way in the 
preface to Philosophical Investigations he says: “I should not like my writing to spare other people 
the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own (PI, preface, 
p.x)”. 
The anti-metaphysical approach to meaning does not say ‘this is meaningful that is not 
meaningful’ but it says ‘there can be different meanings’. So a metaphysical approach to the 
meaning of life can also find a place for itself in the anti-metaphysical one. Neither later 
Wittgenstein nor later Nietzsche tell what the meaning is but say that meaning can be 
divergent. Anti-metaphysical approach to meaning does not lead to a nihilistic attitude as 
Heller claims but rather by introducing multiplicity of grounds and diversity of meanings it 
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gives room to different remedies to our existential problems. The right answer to our 
existential problems is the one that leaves us in peace that we do not need to be concerned 
about anymore. But this peaceful state of mind cannot be achieved via one kind of method. 
Sometimes a nice poem cures our existential illnesses and sometimes just the voice of another 
person in the house makes us feel at ease.  
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